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ACADEMICS, PUBLIC EMPLOYEE SPEECH, AND
THE PUBLIC UNIVERSITY

Jennifer Elrod*
I. INTRODUCTION

Many Americans have an expansive view of the meaning
of free expression. Short of yelling "fire" in a theater, they think
that they can say just about anything they please.' This stance has
been readily accepted and incorporated into the mainstream
political and social language of American culture.2 The notion that
citizens are able openly to express their opinions - whatever they
may be - is a long cherished ideal. Although people are often
drawn to this romanticized belief of commenting freely, the

2

B.A., cum laude, Queens College; J.D., City University of New York Law
School; LL.M., Columbia Law School; Doctoral Candidate, Columbia Law
School. This article is written in partial fulfillment of the requirements of
the Doctor of the Science of Law. My thanks to Patricia J. Williams,
Martha Albertson Fineman, Michael C. Dorf, Vincent Blasi, Drucilla
Cornell, Kent Greenawalt, Joanna Piepgrass, Kendall Thomas, Donna E.
Young, and Victoria Ortiz for helpful comments and suggestions.
See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919). "The most stringent
protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in
a theater and causing a panic." Id at 52.
See, e.g., Dimitra DiFotis, Asbestos Exposure: How Well Are Companies
Insulated? BARRON'S, Dec. 24, 2001, at 21 (saying asbestos liability is "like
shouting 'Fire!' in a crowded theater, it doesn't always mean investors
should rush for the exits"); Mitchell Zacks, Motorola's Big Numbers
Impress Skeptical Market, CHICAGO SUN-TIMES, July 16, 2000, at 52
("Watching a momentum stock after bad news hits is like watching
someone yell fire in a crowded theater - the rush for the exits is chaotic and
swift."); Editorial, Soft Money A Menace, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, Sept. 9,
1999, at 8 ("Perhaps a careful legal analysis could produce a ruling saying
that, just as there is no freedom to shout 'fire' in a crowded theater, there
likewise is no freedom to purchase political favors, thus corrupting the
legislative process, by making large contributions."); Ken Garland, Planner
Widens Land-Use Efforts To Whole County After Tract Sale, KNOXVILLE
NEWS-SENTINEL, Mar. 15, 1998, at BC1 ("We don't have a right to cry fire
in a crowded theater.... If we were considerate of others, we would have no
need for [land use] regulations.").

2
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applicable legal doctrines do not support this idealized view. This
is particularly true for public sector employees.
Many public university professors subscribe to an overly
broad vision of what free speech means.3 They often believe that
their expression, both professional and personal, approaches the
level of nearly complete protection under the First Amendment;
this, however, is not the current legal reality.4 Because the
Supreme Court has deemed professors in public higher education
to be public employees, their expression is accorded limited
constitutional protection under the public employee speech
doctrine. In fact, the protection is far narrower than they - or most
citizens - imagine.
There is a particular irony to this situation when public
employee speech standards are applied to academics in higher
education. 5 After all, a professor is one who professes, one who

My focus in this article centers on the expression by those
who teach in
pubic colleges and universities. I have limited my inquiry not only for
pragmatic reasons of length and manageability but also because the public
higher education institution implicates state action. It is more difficult
(though not impossible) to find state action within the private college or
university. In that setting, as a general rule, one must find a statutory
scheme or contractual agreement. The distinction between public and
private educational institutions traces its origin to Trustees of Dartmouth
College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819). The Supreme Court
held that the New Hampshire legislature's act of changing the name of
Dartmouth College to Dartmouth University was a violation of the
obligation of contract under the U.S. Constitution because the college was a
private corporation based upon its royal charter.
I use the term "academic speech" to create a
term of art, encompassing
expressive activity that is directly related to a professor's scholarly
expertise, teaching, and research.
Colleges and university teachers are
generally viewed as researching,
writing, and teaching in an environment which encourages and values
diverse views on a broad range of topics in a community of adults. The
Supreme Court has endorsed this view in dicta. "The classroom is
peculiarly the 'marketplace of ideas.' The Nation's future depends upon
leaders trained through wide exposure to that robust exchange of ideas
which discovers truth 'out of a multitude of tongues, (rather) than through
any kind of authoritative selection."' Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S.
589, 603 (1967) (citations omitted). See also Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S.
263, 274 n. 14 (1981) (describing college-aged students as adults).
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openly declares or avows or admits her or his views.6 It is the
basis upon which she or he was hired and tenured. Yet, these
views or perspectives involving a professor's field of expertise
may be unprotected expression in the wake of Waters v.
Churchill.7
In that case, the Supreme Court crafted new
restrictions curtailing public employees' opportunities to speak out
on matters of public concern. When applied to the expression of
public university professors, the implications of Waters are
potentially chilling and should be of concern to all academics.
This is so because academic freedom and public employee speech,
when linked together, are difficult concepts to define and
implement in the public university setting.
Waters further
complicates this8 situation by favoring the employer's interest over
the employee's.
In this article, I examine the regulation of the expressive
activities of public university professors through the lens of
Jeffries v. Harleston, to look at the impact of Waters on the
controversial expression of a college teacher. 9 In the former case,
Professor Leonard Jeffries was stripped of his chairmanship of the
Black Studies Department at City College of New York because he
gave a polemical speech off campus. Initially, the Second Circuit
said that the professor's remarks were protected speech.' 0 But
after Waters and following remand, theexpression.
court of appeals held that
protected
Jeffries' statements were not
My interest is to scrutinize "academic speech" (expressive
activity directly related to the professor's field of expertise) that
becomes the focus of controversy where the teacher is speaking
outside the public university campus and in an unofficial

1446 (3d ed. 1992).

6

AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY

7

511 U.S. 661 (1994). See infra Part V.D.2, discussing public employee
speech and Waters; see also infra Part VI, discussing academic speech.

8

Id.

9

10

828 F. Supp. 1066 (S.D.N.Y. 1993), affd in part and vacated in part, 21
F.3d 1238 (2d Cir.), vacated and remanded, 513 U.S. 996 (1994), rev'd, 52
F.3d 9 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 862 (1995).
21 F.3d 1238.

"

52F.3d9.
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capacity.
I contend that if the principles of academic freedom,
the fundamental democratic values of the First Amendment, the
purposes of public higher education, and the functions of a
professor are to coexist meaningfully, then the speech of public
university academics, directly related to their area of scholarship,
must be afforded ample "breathing space," even if this requires a
new or unique subcategory of speech: academic speech. 13 Without
greater protection for academic speech, professors will be hesitant
or reluctant - even unwilling - to explore, to research, and to teach

any topics or theories except those that bear the imprimatur:
"university approved." As a result, higher education will be
stultified.
Greater constitutional protection for academic speech is in
keeping with the jurisprudential underpinnings of the speech clause
of the First Amendment. Thus, I argue for a zone of protection
that allows academic speech both inside and outside the public
institution to be protected when professors are speaking or writing
on matters related to their scholarly expertise.
The issues of academic freedom and the protection
accorded to the speech of public university professors have gained
greater importance and urgency in the aftermath of the horrific
events of September 11, 2001.14 The death, devastation, and
destruction in the wake of the airplane hijackings and subsequent
See, e.g., Sonya G. Smith, Cohen v. San Bernardino Valley College:
The
Scope of Academic Freedom Within the Context of Sexual Harassment
Claims and In-Class Speech, 25 J.C. & U.L. 1, 42-45 (1998) (suggesting a

test for assessing in-class speech of college professors centered on

legitimate pedagogical concerns). See also Amy H. Candido, Comment, A
Right to Talk Dirty?: Academic Freedom Values and Sexual Harassmentin
the University Classroom, 4 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 85 (1996-97);
Donna Prokop, ControversialTeacher Speech: Striking a Balance Between
FirstAmendment Rights and EducationalInterests,66 S. CAL. L. REv. 2533
(1993).

13 See infra Part VI, discussing academic
speech.
14 See, e.g., Jill Radsken, Dave Wedge, and Jack

Sullivan, Attack on America;
Stunned Survivors Watch Their World Go Black, BOSTON HERALD, Sept.
11, 2001, at 12; Todd Purdum and Robin Toner, A Day of Terror: The

Federal Government Driven Underground, Administration and
CongressionalOfficials Stay On the Job, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2001, at A5;
N. R. Kleinfield, US. Attacked: Hijacked Jets Destroy 7Twin Towers and Hit
Pentagonin Day of Terror, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2001, at Al.

,Uu.-UU4
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crashes have been etched indelibly into the national memory. 15
There is an undercurrent of uneasiness as people work to stabilize
their lives and sense of personal safety.
During times of emotional turmoil and national concern,
society seeks to avenge or punish the nation's losses by flexing its
military strength and using its economic power. Simultaneously,
worries over security and social order at home are raised to new
heights. In an attempt to respond and preempt attacks in the future,
laws are enacted quickly by Congress or Executive Orders are
handed down by the President, seeking to punish wrong doers and
to prevent other harms or threats to the nation. 16
In this atmosphere of heightened tension and fear over
safety and domestic tranquility, civil liberties are at great risk of
being restricted. This country has a lengthy record of suppressing
civil liberties in times of national emergencies. The Alien and
Sedition Acts in 1798,17 the suspension of civil liberties during the
Civil War,' 8 the Espionage Act of 1917,19 and the Smith Act of

15
16

17

See, e.g., Editorial, The War Against America: An Unfathomable Attack,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2001, at A26.
See Patricia J. Williams, By Any Means Necessary, NATION,
Nov. 26, 2001,
at 11 (commenting on the unprecedented powers given to law enforcement
and intelligence agencies without judicial oversight under the USA Patriot
Act).
See Alien Enemies Act, I Stat. 577 (1798) (expired); Sedition
Act, 1 Stat.
596 (1798) (expired); Alien Act, 1 Stat. 570 (1798) (expired);
Naturalization Act, 1 Stat. 596 (1798) (expired). See also JAMES MORTON
SMITH, FREEDOM'S

18

19

FETTERS:

THE ALIEN AND SEDITION

LAWS AND

AMERICAN CiL LIBERTIES (1956).
See Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866). See
also MARK E.
NEELY, JR., THE FATE OF LIBERTY: ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND CiviL
LIBERTIES (1991); Michael Kent Curtis, Lincoln, Vallandigham, and AntiWar Speech in the Civil War, 7 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 105 (1998).
See Act of 1917, ch. 30, § 3, 40 Stat. 219; see also Act
ofMay 16, 1918, ch.
75, § 1, 40 Stat. 553, repealed, Act of March 3, 1921, ch. 136, 41 Stat. 1360.
The Act of May 16, 1918, amended the 1917 Act and restricted speech and
dissent. See also ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED
STATES, chs. II-VII (1942); WILLIAM PRESTON, JR., ALIENS & DISSENTERS:
FEDERAL SUPPRESSION OF RADICALS, 1903-1933, chs. IV-VIII (2d ed.
1994).
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194020 are some examples of measures enacted when fears
concerning threats to the country's security overwhelm decision
makers. These can be explained, in part, by the aftershocks of
national trauma, "an event that upsets [society's] fundamental
ideas about what can and should happen and challenges the
authority of its basic values" 21 as government actors and citizens
22
try to cope and come to terms with horrific occurrences.
These restrictive laws should serve as reminders that civil
liberties are in jeopardy in times of national crisis. What is true in
the larger society is also true on the campuses of colleges and
universities. The fallout from September 11 has been both
positive23 and negative 24 in institutions of higher learning. Like
20

See Act of June 28, 1940,
BELKNAP,

21

22

COLD

ch. 439, §§ 1-5, 54 Stat. 670. See also MICHAL R.

WAR POLITICAL

JUSTICE:

THE

SMITH

ACT,

THE

COMMUNIST PARTY, AND AMERICAN CiviL LIBERTIES (1977).
See Richard Slotkin, Our Myths of Choice, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Sept.
28, 2001, at 11 ("At the bottom of our reaction to a traumatic event like
[Sept. 11 is rage, grief, humiliation, and a sense of helplessness. We
invoke our myths to help us to begin to function again....").
See Patricia J. Williams, Homeland Insecurity, NATION, Nov. 12, 2001, at
11.

23

24

The thing that worries me most about this time is how hard it
is to talk about anything but fear. The fight has been framed
as a war with "terror," a battle against an unruly if deadly
emotionalism, rather than a war against specific bodies,
specific land, specific resources. A war against terrorism is
the inverse of a war "for" courage. It is a war of the mind, so
broadly defined that the enemy becomes anybody who makes
you afraid. Id
See, e.g., Ana Marie Cox, The Changed Classroom, Post-September 11,
CHRON. HIGHER EDuC., Oct. 26, 2001, at 16.
In institutions of all types and sizes, and in a wide variety of
disciplines, [college] instructors are struggling with how the
events of September 11 have forced them to re-evaluate what
they teach and how they teach it. ... Students' interest in
topics related to the terrorists attacks has made for
overflowing classrooms in Near Eastern-Studies departments,
and had ratcheted up enrollment in course on Islam, Arabic,
and international studies as well. Id.
See, e.g., Arlene Levinson, College Faculty, Staff Find Chilling
New
Climatefor Free Speech On Campus, ASSOC. PRESS STATE & LOCAL WIRE,
Oct. 12, 2001. "Around the country, college faculty and staff who express
opinions on the terrorist attacks and U.S. bombardment of Afghanistan are
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some individuals in the larger society, a number of professors
found themselves attacked for failing to espouse pro-patriotism
views or for expressing dissident or differing perspectives
following September 11th. 25 Even the Vice President's wife,
Lynne Cheney, jumped onto the bandwagon with her group the
American Council of Trustees and Alumni, decrying the
expression of dissent on college campuses and publishing a report,
naming the names of the unpatriotic. 26 Such efforts demonstrate
facing rebuke in public and private, suspension and investigation.... People
across the political spectrum are feeling the chill." Id.
See, e.g., Comments On US.Policy Put Professor On Hot Seat, BERGEN

REC. (NJ), Sept. 27, 2001, at A 16. "[Robert Jensen] who teaches journalism
at the University of Texas at Austin, began writing articles for newspapers
and Internet sites soon after the attacks, arguing that the United States has
inflicted death and destruction on civilians in Iraq, Vietnam, and Panama."
See also Michael Janofsky, National Briefing Southwest, New Mexico:
Professor Jokes about Attack, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 2001, at A16. "A

26

professor [Richard Bethold] who has taught ancient history at the
University of New Mexico for 29 years faces disciplinary action for telling
his students after the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks that 'anyone who can blow up
the Pentagon gets my vote."' Id. He later apologized. CUNY Chancellor,
Trustees Rip Professors' Union Forum, NEWSDAY, Oct. 6, 2001, at A3 1.
"Trustees of the City University of New York plan to endorse a statement
by Chancellor Matthew Goldstein denouncing the professors' union for
sponsoring a forum that blamed U.S. foreign policy for the Sept. 11 terrorist
attacks." Id.
See THE AMERICAN COUNCIL OF TRUSTEES AND ALUMNI (ACTA)
Defending Civilization: How Our Universities Are Failing America and
What Can Be Done About It (2002).

In the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks, Americans
across the country responded with anger, patriotism, and
support of military intervention. ... Not so in academe. Even

as many institutions enhanced security and many students
exhibited American flags, professors across the country
sponsored teach-ins that typically ranged from moral
equivocation to explicit condemnations of America. Id
But see Stuart Eskenazi, Is Report a Blueprint for a New Blacklist?;
Academic Freedom Is Under Attack Since Sept. 11, Some Professors Say,

Dec.16, 2001, at Al. "The council report, when originally
issued, identified faculty, students and campus speakers by name. But the
council removed them a few days later in a revised report now posted on the
group's Web site www.goacta.org." Id. At the time, ACTA's board
included Richard Lamm, former Governor of Colorado, William Bennett,
former Secretary of Education, Saul Bellow, author, and Joseph Lieberman,
SEATTLE TIMES,
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the tenuous footing for free expression in times of national trauma,
27
especially at institutions of higher learning.
Before explaining the protected zone of academic speech, I
discuss four relevant concepts: academic freedom, democracy,
higher education, and public employee speech. Each of these
principles has an important role in the present configuration of
expression that is protected (or not) for professors in public higher
education. Although each of these four concepts developed within
different time frames and disciplines, there is now intermingling
between and among them within the legal system.
These
principles do not fit neatly or completely within one another.
Therefore, it is useful to understand the development and
parameters of each because the ways in which these concepts
converge and diverge in the context of the law of free speech
makes it easier to comprehend why it is necessary and vital to
protect the academic speech of professors in institutions of public
higher education.
II. ACADEMIC FREEDOM

A. Definitions
Academic freedom is a concept that is often discussed and
debated by scholars inside and outside the legal academy.28 There
U.S. Senator from Connecticut. Id. See also Emily Eakin, On the Lookout
for PatrioticIncorrectness,N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 2001, at A 15 (describing
27

ACTA as "a conservative nonprofit group devoted to curbing liberal
tendencies in academia").
See, e.g., Kilian Betlach, McCarthyism Revisited, U-WIRE, Nov. 20, 2001.
[The American Council of Trustees and Alumni report is] not

argumentation or criticism or "a robust exchange of ideas."
The ACTA report is blatant intimidation, an ugly attempt to
silence voices of dissent. ... Actions such as these have the
potential to change the fiber of this country in a way the
terrorist attacks were unable to. We are a country founded on
dissent and the right of the public to question the workings of

government - particularly during a time when Congressional
leaders seem so unwillingly to do so - functions as perhaps the
most important manifestation of the checks and balances
system. Id.
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is no agreed upon definition, there are no agreed upon lines of
demarcation. Rather than a hard and fast principle, academic
freedom is a very elastic concept. 29 It expands and contracts with

28

See, e.g., ROBERT M. O'NEILL, FREE SPEECH IN THE COLLEGE COMMUNITY
(1997); THE FUTURE OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM (Louis Menand, ed., 1996);
ISSUES IN ACADEMIC FREEDOM (George S. Worgul, Jr., ed., 1992);
REGULATING THE INTELLECTUALS: PERSPECTIVES ON ACADEMIC FREEDOM
IN THE 1980s (Craig Kaplan & Ellen Schrecker, eds., 1983); FREEDOM,
ORDER, AND THE UNIVERSITY (James R. Wilburn, ed., 1982); THE CONCEPT
OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM (Edmund Pincoffs, ed.,
METZGER, DIMENSIONS OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM

1975);
(1969)

WALTER P.

(hereinafter

METZGER, DIMENSIONS); ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND TENURE:
A
HANDBOOK OF THE AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS
(Louis Joughin, ed., 1967); RICHARD HOFSTADTER & WALTER P. METZGER,
THE DEVELOPMENT OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN THE UNITED STATES (1955);
ROBERT M. MACIVER, ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN OUR TIME (1955). See also
Symposium on Zealotry and Academic Freedom, 22 WM. MITCHELL L. REV.

29

333 (1996); Academic Freedom and Tenure Symposium, 15 PACE L. REV. 5
(1994); William W. Van Alstyne, ed., Freedom and Tenure in the Academy:
The Fiftieth Anniversary of the 1940 Statement of Principles, 53 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (1990); Symposium on Academic Freedom, 66 TEX. L.
REV. 1247 (1988); Lionel S. Lewis, Academic Freedom: A New Threat?, 44
J. HIGHER EDUC. 548 (1973); Immanuel Wallerstein, Academic Freedom
and Collective Expressions of Opinion, 42 J. HIGHER EDUC. 713 (1973);
Academic Freedom Symposium, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 429 (1963);
Academic Freedom: A Journal Symposium, 20 J. HIGHER EDUC. 339
(1949); L. L. Thurstone, Academic Freedom, 1 J. HIGHER EDUC. 136
(1930).
See, e.g., W. Stuart Stuller, High School Academic Freedom: The Evolution
of A Fish Out of Water, 77 NEB. L. REV. 301 (1998). "[The] courts are
remarkably consistent in their unwillingness to give analytical shape to the
rhetoric of academic freedom." Id. at 302. J. Peter Byrne, Academic
Freedom: A "Special Concern of the FirstAmendment," 99 YALE L.J. 251
(1989). "There has been no adequate analysis of what academic freedom the
Constitution protects or of why it protects it. Lacking definition or guiding
principle, the doctrine floats in the law, picking up decisions as a hull does
barnacles." Id at 253. Walter P. Metzger, Profession and Constitution:
Two Definitions of Academic Freedom in America, 66 TEX. L. REV. 1265
(1988) (hereinafter Metzger, Profession and Constitution). "A sizeable
literature of legal commentary asserts that the Supreme Court
constitutionalized academic freedom without adequately defining it. A
discomforting perception of the weak theoretical underpinnings of this
concept seems to go with the inclination to write about it at all." Id. at 1289.
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great frequency, allowing for multiple interpretations. 30 In one
formulation, as some scholars, trustees, and judges assert,
academic freedom is the province of the educational institution. Its
sole purpose is to ensure the university's autonomy to determine its
mission, its course of instruction, those professors it employs, and
those students it admits, because only those persons within the
institution know best how to carry out these functions. This
autonomy insulates the university from outside actors such as
and others who lack the requisite expertise in
legislators, judges,
3'
matters.
such
In another formulation, other theorists contend that
protection for the individual teacher, researcher, and scholar exists
in order to promote, protect, and encourage the discovery of truth
and the advancement of knowledge; this is also known as academic
freedom. 3 2 In many instances, the institution (trustees and highlevel administrators) and its faculty are on the same side of the
definition and interpretation of academic freedom. Each agrees
that the university and its professors ought to have control over the
internal operation of the school in all its aspects. The difficulty,
however, arises when the university and the professor are on
opposing sides of an issue that implicates the academic freedom of
the teacher, regardless of whether it is33a question of hiring, firing,
teaching, or other educational matters.
30

See, e.g., Walter P. Metzger, Professional and Legal Limits to Academic
Freedom, 20 J.C. & U.L. 1 (1993); David M. Rabban, A FunctionalAnalysis
of "Individual" and "Institutional" Academic Freedom Under the First
Amendment, 53 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 227 (1990); William W. Van
Alstyne, Academic Freedom and the First Amendment in the Supreme
Court of the United States: An UnhurriedHistorical Review, 53 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 79 (1990); THE AMERICAN CONCEPT OF ACADEMIC
FREEDOM IN FORMATION (Walter P. Metzger, ed., 1977).

32

See, e.g., Byrne, supra note 29, at 311-23.
See, e.g., Perry A. Zirkel, Academic Freedom of Individual Faculty

3

Members, 47 EDUC. L. REP. 809 (1988).
The issue of tenure is beyond the scope of this article. See MICHAEL A.

31

OLIvAs, THE LAW AND HIGHER EDUCATION: CASES AND MATERIALS ON

COLLEGES IN COURT ch.3 (2d ed. 1997) (collecting cases and commentary
on tenure, promotion, and termination of faculty); see also TERRY L. LEAP,
TENURE, DISCRIMINATION, AND THE COURTS (2d ed. 1995) (discussing
issues involving the tenure process and reviewing the relevant cases).

2003-2004

Academic Speech and the Public University

When professors turn to the federal courts for resolution of
issues connected to their relationship to the university, they often
claim - among other things - that their right of free speech has
been abridged and then use the term "academic freedom" as a
catch-all phrase, implying that these terms are coextensive. The
connection between academic freedom and protected expression is
not seamless. Indeed, academic freedom is not a recognized34
category under the Supreme Court's free speech jurisprudence.
The term is a relatively recent occurrence in Court opinions,
beginning in the mid-twentieth century. 35 The Court has never
decided the issue of academic freedom directly, and, thus, the
concept has little, if any, legal traction. Instead, the Court has
offered a number of observations and lofty statements with regard
to the principles and values of academic freedom and higher
education that it deems important. I will analyze these concepts
shortly. 36 First, I examine briefly the development of academic
freedom in America that occurred outside the legal system. This
development is significant because it is responsible for the popular
and non-legal view of academic freedom that is held by professors
and instructors in higher education and by members of the public.
B. Development Outside the Legal System
1. Expansion of Higher Education
The concept of academic freedom became a valued and
desired ideal for university professors in the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries in the United States. Following the Civil
War, higher education experienced the same rapid expansion as did

14

35

36

See infra Part IV.B, discussing Supreme Court's view of academic freedom
in dicta.

See Metzger, Profession and Constitution, supra note 29. "Before the
middle of [the twentieth] century, no American court had ruled that any
provision of the federal constitution protected academic freedom. Indeed,
no petitioner in any federal court appears to have framed a legal action that
required the issue to be settled judicially one way or the other." Id. at 1285.
See infra Part IV, discussing the Supreme Court and academic freedom.
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the nation's economy. 37
The influx of capital, increased
industrialization, and the development of the modem major
corporation fueled the country's fast-paced economic growth.
The university played an important and integral role in the creation
of the modem American state. As big business grew, so, too, did
the demand for* a trained cadre of professionals:
lawyers,
engineers, architects, accountants, and others who were needed to
facilitate and perpetuate the momentous and speedy growth that
the national economy was undergoing. Colleges and universities
became the primary training ground for professionals and future
leaders of industry. Institutions of higher education were often
seen by those inside and outside the academy as the incubators of
scientific, technological, and social advancements. 39 At the same
time, in the public's mind, higher education became a gateway
through which one could pass in order to gain greater social status
and higher paying positions.4 ° Thus, colleges and universities
appealed broadly to various segments and communities within the
United States since these institutions served multiple purposes.
Along with the growth in the number of American colleges
and universities, there were dramatic changes within the
institutions themselves. The scientific method was the engine
driving the courses, the departments, and the research conducted at
colleges and universities. Accompanying the elevation of the
scientific approach, the curriculum underwent a radical

37

HOFSTADTER & METZGER, supra note 28, at 22-24. Before the Civil War

(1861-65), the average American college was small in size - both as to
professors (5 or 6) and students (fewer than 100). Most colleges were little

more than a fancy high school. Thus, it was more aspiration than a reality to
have a college degree. Id.
38

CHRISTOPHER J. LUCAS, AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION:

A

HISTORY

139-

51(1990).
39

40

FREDERICK RUDOLPH, THE AMERICAN COLLEGE & UNIVERSITY

356-57
(1990). The "service ideal of the American university" grew out of"a

middle-class sense of obligation, a readiness to bring American society to
some new sense of its problems and promises. The simultaneous spread of
the Progressive spirit and the university idea would of course tend to
reinforce the service element of both." Id.
See LUCAS, supra note 38, at 139-51.
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transformation. 41 Rather than a classical education of fixed
knowledge that trained students for civic leadership and the
ministry, the new curriculum was compartmentalized with specific
fields of study such as economics, chemistry, engineering, and
other discrete subject areas in order to search for and discover
truth.42 The college curriculum provided more particularized areas
of study with direct applications to society. As the curriculum
shifted from classical to modem, the institutions of higher
education changed significantly, moving rapidly toward greater
specialization, increased departmentalization, larger and larger
numbers of teachers, and an ever-expanding bureaucracy with the
enrollment of more and more students.
2. Professionalization of College Teaching
The rapid expansion of the university also brought with it a
problem that was of particular interest to its teachers: the
dismissals and forced resignations of professors who espoused
views with which the president or trustees of an institution
disagreed.43 At the close of the nineteenth century, a professor
41

See

HOFSTADTER & METZGER,

supra note 28, at 226-28.

Prior to the

emergence of the modem college, the curriculum was based upon a
Renaissance model. There were no electives. Students were required to
follow a rigid instructional program that included Greek, Latin, Rhetoric,
Logic, Philosophy, and Mathematics. The method of instruction was rote
learning and recitation by the pupil on a daily basis. Id. "Drudgery in
learning and recitation by rote were considered valuable in themselves, as
helping to promote mental discipline." Id. at 229. See also S. WILLIS RUDY,
THE COLLEGE OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK:

42

43

A HISTORY, 1847-1947, 61

(1949). The purpose of the classical education was to develop and train the
student's mental discipline. Such discipline, in turn, would enhance the
student's moral character. Id
See RUDOLPH, supranote 39, at 290-306, 338-48.
See CLYDE W. BARROW, UNIVERSITIES AND THE CAPITALIST STATE:
CORPORATE LIBERALISM AND THE RECONSTRUCTION OF AMERICAN HIGHER

1894-1928, 205 (1990). The firing or forced resignation of
professors has been part of the academic landscape since the earliest days of
American colleges in the seventeenth century. However, by the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the number of dismissals was quite
large and politically driven. Often, college teachers were terminated
because both in the classroom and outside the university campus they
EDUCATION,
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who expressed a viewpoint that was deemed socially,
economically, or politically unorthodox was often terminated by
the university president. 44 Academics were becoming alarmed by
the increasing numbers of professors who were forced out of the
teaching ranks. In the wake of these firings and coerced
resignations, professors realized that they needed job protection
and they began to discuss academic freedom.
3. Teaching Freedom and Job Security
Academic freedom was an idea that had been brought to
this country from abroad. After the Civil War, many American
professors went to Germany for additional study and training in the
absence of doctoral programs in the United States. This crosscultural exchange brought the German principle of academic
expressed their belief in either socialism or populism. Edward W. Beemis
is one example. A noted economist at the University of Chicago, he was an
ardent supporter of populism. Beemis not only wrote scholarly articles on
the principles of public ownership of utilities but also spoke about such
matters during off-campus public meetings. He was fired when he refused
to acquiesce to the demand of the university's president that Beemis stop all
of his outside activities on behalf of populist causes. The University of
Chicago had been the recipient of a $35,000,000 donation from John D.
Rockefeller, the founder of Standard Oil. It is unlikely that Rockefeller
would have favored municipal ownership of utilities. Thus, the president
and trustees would have been concerned about the university's outside
sources of funding and its public image in the larger world when Beemis
advocated public ownership of utilities both on and off the campus. See also
HOFSTADTER & METZGER, supra note 28, at 425-36; LUCAS, supra note 38,
at 194-97. One scholar theorized that the creation of discrete disciplines
and the professionalization of college teaching forced academics to choose
between keeping their teaching positions and advocating viewpoints that
were tied to their academic expertise. See MARY 0. FURNER, ADVOCACY &
OBJECTIVITY:
A CRISIS IN THE PROFESSIONALIiATION OF AMERICAN
SOCIAL SCIENCE,
44

1865-1905, 163-83 (1975).

For example, in the late 1890s, John R. Commons was fired from Indiana
University because he held "controversial" political views [populism];
James Allen Smith was terminated by Marietta College for speaking out
against monopolies during his political science classes; Brown University
fired E. Benjamin Andrews because he expressed his position favoring a
silver standard. See HOFSTADTER & METZGER, supra note 28, at 420-21;
FURNER, supranote 43, at 198-204, 206-28.
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freedom to the American professoriate. Like many university
concepts transplanted from Germany to this country, Americans
put their own spin on them. As an example, under the German
concept, academic research was one component of the larger
principle of academic freedom, and it was initiated only from
within the university. American college professors adopted this
principle and then tacked onto it an external component: an
outside person or entity (a business, a group, or an individual)
could encourage the university to undertake a particular research
project by offering to fund it. Thus, under the American version of
the research component, the university and industry enjoyed an
increasingly intertwined economic relationship, an arrangement
that was improper under the German conception of academic
freedom.45
Important to this discussion of academic freedom are two
related German concepts: lernfreiheit and lehrfreiheit. In rough
translation, these ideals are "learning freedom" (the teacher free to
teach and to inquire) and "teaching freedom" (the teacher free of
administrative interference in curricular matters). In Germany,
under the theory of teaching freedom, professors' speech was
protected only within the classroom setting.
Once more,
Americans adopted this position and then enlarged it, asserting that
teachers were protected when they spoke in their capacity as
citizens outside the walls of their institution.
These two principles of learning and teaching freedom
gained many adherents when the academic community was
galvanized by the terminations of two professors by Stanford
University in 1900.46 As a result, a growing number of academics
45

See HOFSTADTER & METZGER, supra note 28, at 379-83. But see generally
BARROW, supra note 43 (providing a critical view of the effect of corporate
funding on higher education and its ability to mold university policies and
practices).

46

See LAURENCE VEYSEY, THE EMERGENCE OF THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY

402 (1965). Edward A. Ross and George E. Howard were fired. Professor
Ross, an economist, spoke publicly about his opposition to Chinese
immigration and his promotion of municipal ownership of public utilities.
Jane Lathrop Stanford, the university's sole trustee, disagreed with Ross'
views. She believed that Ross' association "with the political demagogues
of San Francisco ...
play[ed] into the hands of the lowest and vilest elements
of socialism .....
" Id. The university, according to Mrs. Stanford, could not
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viewed the freedom from administrative interference and the desire
for job security as indispensable components of the emerging
concept of academic freedom in America. Teachers in higher
education realized that each time one of their colleagues was fired
or - as was more likely - forced to resign, there was a clear threat
to the intellectual climate of their own research and scholarship.
Professors came to believe that they had common goals, concerns,
and needs.47 One of the most important was the right to speak,
think, and write about one's scholarly pursuits without fear of
reprisal simply because an administrator or trustee held a contrary
view. As one scholar has described it, there was no university
unless there was academic freedom. "[I]t was an ideal that
elevated academic freedom from an undefined and unconscious
yearning to a conscious and declared necessity of academic
'
existence. AS
On the faculty's part, there was a concerted push for greater
job security. The pressure of an ever-tighter job market that
resulted from the increasing numbers of job seekers who sought
professorships and the concern of those holding college teaching
afford to have its neutrality compromised and she prevailed upon the
university's president to fire Ross.
When Professor Howard was
subsequently terminated, several other faculty members resigned in protest.
Id. at 438. See also HOFSTADTER & METZGER, supra note 28, at 438-45;
FURNER, supra note 43, at 229-53.
47 See FURNER, supra note 43, at 244. According to Furner, the most effective
way for professors to protect and defend their positions as advocates of an
area of scholarly endeavor was the tenet that the only qualified
commentators on a particular topic were those with expertise in that
discipline, only other scholars in that field met that qualification. Of course,
it is also true that not all scholars shared the same view of what it meant to
be engaged in scholarly research. Thus, if a scholar's views were not
embraced or supported by important members of that particular discipline,
the academic was ineffective in seeking to challenge the president or
trustees of a college who wanted to oust the teacher. The example of
Professor Beemis of the University of Chicago illustrates this situation.
Other prominent economists, notably John B. Clark of Amherst College,
opposed Beemis' position of public ownership of utilities and when Beemis
became embroiled in a dispute with his home institution, the University of
Chicago, he was without the support of influential economists within that
specialty. Id. at 183-85. See also supranote 43.
8 See LUCAS, supra note 38, at 198.
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positions advanced this issue to the forefront in academia in the
early twentieth century. The demand for job security in the form
of tenure grew more persistent and more vocal.49 In turn, teaching
freedom and job security were inextricably intertwined or were
seen as a unitary concept in the view of many professors'.
4. American Association of University Professors
One response to the insistent call for greater job security
and teaching freedom by professors was the creation, in 1915, of
the American Association of University Professors (AAUP). It
was organized by a group of well-respected academics from the
top-tier universities and colleges, including Arthur 0. Lovejoy,
E.R.A. Seligman, and John Dewey, among others. 50 Academics
understood that there was a value to and a necessity for an
organization that they controlled, including its platform,
publications, and publicity; thus, the AAUP was formed.
a. 1915 Declaration of Principles
In part, the AAUP was created to ensure academic freedom
and to defend the tenure of the professoriate. 5 ' Under its
organizational principles, the group asserted the need for
professors to express their views with regard to their research and
writing and not simply to serve as spokespersons for universitymandated ideas; to have freedom in their teaching; and to have the
liberty to express their views outside the university, "extra-mural
utterance and action. ' ,52 These three prongs were all necessary

41

50

51

See BARROW, supra note 43, at 209-10 (describing academic
freedom as a
political symbol in garnering support for job security).
See also
HOFSTADTER & METZGER, supranote 28, at 454.
METZGER, DIMENSIONS, supra note 28, at 2 (discussing
academic freedom
in delocalized academic settings).
See The 1915 Declaration of Principles, supra note 28, at 155, in
ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND TENURE: A HANDBOOK OF THE AMERICAN
AsSOCIATIoN OF UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS [hereinafter The 1915

52

Declaration].
Id. at 158.
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components for the university if it was to be "an intellectual
experiment station" with the aim of advancing knowledge.53
The principles of the AAUP addressed one problem
inherent in the hierarchy of the university: the ultimate control of
the institution of higher education was in the hands of the trustees
and not the members of the faculty. This posed a potential
difficulty because the faculty thought that its members should
guide and manage the university as it was the professors, not the
trustees, who had the necessary expertise. To solve this dilemma
of control, the AAUP posited that there was a distinction between
two types of institutions of higher education:
proprietary
institutions and those of higher learning. The former was an
instrument of propaganda for a specific religious group or a
wealthy individual's special cause; it was not amenable to the
principles of the freedom of research and discovery. 54 In contrast,
the principles of academic freedom attached to the institution of
higher learning. The AAUP maintained that within such an
educational institution, the regents held the ultimate power but they
were the trustees of a public trust rather than a proprietary
interest.5"
At the same time, the drafters of the 1915 Declaration
sought to ameliorate the problem of control by elevating professors
to a unique status: appointee rather than employee. They were
experts within their fields while trustees were not. Academics and
trustees were analogized to federal judges and the president who
nominates them. 56 Once judges take the bench, the president who
appointed them cannot tell them when or how to decide cases. The
same principle applied in the academic setting. According to the
AAUP, professors were answerable to the public in the sense that
teachers were to pursue their scholarly inquiries so that they could
make discoveries, advance knowledge, educate students, and create
experts to provide service to the community, resolving societal and
57
scientific problems.

"

54

s

56

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

167.
158-59.
150.
162-63.

7 Id. at 166-67.
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Professors were obliged to conduct themselves in an
appropriate manner whether in the classroom or the outside world.
In the university classroom setting, teachers were to provide
students with an opportunity to ponder intelligently and to think for
themselves rather than promote a set of convenient conclusions.58
Outside the academic institution, professors were obligated to
conduct themselves in manner that avoided exaggerated or
untested statements. 59 Further, academics were to omit making
statements in a sensational or inappropriate fashion. 60 Under
AAUP principles, the profession would police itself, leaving
control of the faculty in the hands of those (and only those) with
61
the expertise to judge other scholars.
However, the lack of a concrete definition or an agreement
as to what constituted knowledge was but one of the potential
problems encountered by professors. If, as the AAUP founders
urged, the university was an experiment station of the mind, then
presumably this arena of experimentation should be open to all
types of ideas, theories, and investigations. However, if the
concept of knowledge is defined narrowly, depending upon who
crafted it, then the term would be quite limiting. As an example, in
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, dissident
viewpoints that posited a socialist interpretation of political or
societal matters might be deemed as outside acceptable
knowledge. 62 Therefore, the investigation of socialism would be
unprotected under AAUP principles if knowledge were defined in
a narrow manner.
In theory, academic freedom as promoted by the AAUP
held great promise, but in practice, it fell far short of its stated
goals and aspirations. There was some bark but little bite to the
principles propounded by the AAUP. Most significantly, there
was no avenue through which the AAUP could require or compel a
particular university or college to comply with AAUP principles

58

59
60
61
62

Id. at 169.
Id.
Id. at 172.

Id. at 169.

See supranotes 43-47 and accompanying text.
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and practices, because the organization had no powers other than
persuasion to enforce its policies, goals, and principles.63
Further, the university - that is, trustees and high-level
administrators - had frequently been uncomfortable when its
teachers expressed minority, unorthodox, or dissident viewpoints
either inside or outside of the academic setting.64 Often, the
president or trustees were concerned about the potential or actual
interference from outside actors, the possible loss of donations, and
the impact of adverse public opinion upon the educational
institution. As a result of this discomfiture, a number of professors
were fired or forced to resign for statements they had uttered or
written, or both, that did not comport with the status quo within a
given academic institution. This is illustrated by the many teachers
who were terminated for publicly expressing anti-war sentiments
during World War 1.65 Such terminations were not limited to those
war years. During the 1930s, those teachers who were perceived
to be "Reds" were ousted from institutions of higher education.66
63

64

65

66

The federal courts were not appropriate venues for the resolution of
academic matters at this historical moment. See infra Part IV, discussing
the Supreme Court and academic freedom.
As used in this article, the term "minority" is defined expansively and
denotes individuals who are members of a group based upon race, ethnicity,
gender, sexual orientation, disability, class, political affiliation, or other
such identity categories or those who are labeled by the dominant group as
being "other," "outside," or "different."
See HOFSTADTER & METZGER, supra note 28,
at 498-502. During
America's participation in World War 1,Columbia University's President,
Nicholas Butler Murray, rescinded academic freedom on campus. Among
the many who spoke out against the war in violation of that order were
Professors J. McKean Cattell, Leon Fraser, and Henry Wadsworth
Longfellow Dana. They were fired. In response, three other notable
Columbia academics resigned: Charles A. Beard, Henry R. Mussey, and
Ellery C. Stowell. See also CAROL S. GRUBER, MARS AND MINERVA:
WORLD WAR I AND THE USES OF HIGHER LEARNING IN AMERICA 191-206
(1975); WILLIAM SUMMERSCALES,
AFFIRMATION AND DISSENT:
COLUMBIA'S RESPONSE TO THE CRISIS OF WORLD WAR I, ch. 4 (1990).
Those professors who espoused views described as socialist, communist, or
bolshevik were often labeled with the catch-all term "Reds." In 1937, the
editors of one law review noted: "Despite the unanimity with which
educators profess their faith in the ideal of an independent scholarship, it is
clear that some university teachers have been dismissed for their opinions,
and many are inhibited in what they say and write on socially controversial
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In the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s, academics were terminated
because they were deemed to be communists or because they had
refused to sign a loyalty oath.6 7 More recent examples include
68
professors who espoused Marxist views.
b. 1940 Statement of Principles
The AAUP did reassert itself on the question of academic
freedom in its 1940 Statement of Principles, seeking to clarify its
position. Professors had to be permitted freedom of expression
because the purpose of a university education was the "common
good ... which depends upon the free search and its free
expression.... ' 69 Academic freedom ensured this important goal by
protecting both the teaching and research functions carried out by
professors. 70 The AAUP went further. It addressed the issue of
extra-mural statements by academics which was - perhaps - the

67

68

69

70

issues and their political activity, by fear of academic reprisals." Comment,
Academic Freedom, 46 YALE L.J. 670 (1937).
See generally MACIVER, supra note 28. Maclver wrote
a thoughtful and
thorough study of threats to professors and the struggles over the issue of
communism on college and university campuses from 1930s through the
early 1950s. He argued forcefully against the imposition of loyalty oaths,
the legislative investigations of professors, and the banning of teaching. the
theory of communism. Such efforts to censor or control higher education
are not worthwhile because: "[tihe way of education is to have the student
wrestle with ideas, to teach him to reason, to exercise intelligent choice, and
to give him the opportunity to do so." Id. at 189 (emphasis in original). See
also ELLEN W. SCHRECKER, NO IVORY TOWER: MCCARTHYISM & THE
UNIVERSrrIEs ch. 2-3 (1986) (providing an insightful and detailed history of
the purging of communists from American universities and colleges during
the McCarthy and the Cold War eras).
See, e.g., Regents v. Super. Ct., 83 Cal. Rptr. 549 (1969), vacated,476 P.2d
457 (Cal. 1970) (upholding Regents' power of termination with regard to
Angela Y. Davis' employment at University of California, Los Angeles
because she was a Marxist).
The 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure With
1970 Interpretive Comments 3, in AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY
PROFESSORS POLICY DOCUMENTS & REPORTS (1990) [hereinafter The 1940
Statement].
See Walter P. Metzger, The 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic
Freedom and Tenure, 53 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3 (1990).

Buffalo Public Interest Law Journal

Vol. XXII

thorniest of the problems that had plagued professors and the
organization for many years.
The AAUP posited that professors were not only teachers
but also citizens of the larger world. In that latter capacity,
academics should be free from institutional intrusions and
suppression when speaking or writing as citizens. 71 However,
professors also were under the obligation to conduct themselves
appropriately because the public might draw conclusions about
both the profession and the teacher's home institution.' Academics,
therefore, were encouraged to be accurate and restrained in making
their public statements, to accord respect to the views of others,
appearance that they served as
and to distance themselves from the
72
university.
the
for
a spokesperson
Despite the AAUP's efforts to create professional norms
for the professoriate and the institutions that employed them, the
concept and the reality of academic freedom remained susceptible
of multiple meanings and interpretations. It was often too elastic,
too malleable. One difficulty posed by elasticity was that rather
than affording protection, it was too ambiguous, too lacking in
guidance for those matters that presented the greatest challenge
and difficulty. Principles and goals could be interpreted as widely
or as narrowly by the trustees or the administrators as the situation
required. More significantly, the AAUP had no power to force
colleges or universities to abide by the organization's rules. 73 At
71
72

See The 1940 Statement, supra note 70, at 4.
In its subsequent comments interpreting the 1940 Statement, the AAUP
stated that the thrust of its principle was not to discourage a professor from
speaking as a citizen. It noted that the only basis for dismissal following

extramural statements would be a clear demonstration that the individual
was not fit to fulfill his professional duties. "Extramural utterances rarely
bear upon the faculty member's fitness for the position. Moreover, a final
decision should take into account the faculty member's entire record as a
teacher and scholar." Id. at 6, citing Committee A Statement on Extramural
Utterances, 51 AAUP BULL. 29 (1965). Further, any dismissal of a faculty

member on the basis of extramural utterances would have to be based on a

clear showing of the professor's unfitness for her job. The 1940 Statement,
73

supra note 70, at 4.
The 1940 Statement, supra note 70, at x-xii, Adopting or DisclaimingAA UP
Polices and AA UP Policies in the Courts; see also id. at xii (describing
AAUP policies as "a body of persuasive professional opinion").
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most, the AAUP could place a school on its list of censured
institutions. However, there is no evidence that such a listing had
any effect upon an institution's ability to educate its students, hire
faculty, receive donations, and conduct research. Indeed, this lack
of enforcement power would eventually send professors to the
courts for results that they could not obtain through the auspices of
the AAUP.
III. THE FIRST AMENDMENT'S DEMOCRATIC IMPULSES

A. Madisonian Principles of Democracy
The cornerstone of any theory of free speech under the First
Amendment is, implicitly or explicitly, democracy. The Framers
looked to earlier thinkers like John Locke and other Enlightenment
philosophers to craft the principles of the American Constitution.
These enlightened ideals are exemplified by the writings of James
Madison. He believed in the principle of equality, that "no man
should be a slave and no man a master, ... all alike are born to use
the common advantages of nature for their preservation and
happiness according to their needs and lights and gifts. ' ' 75 For
Madison, men must band together through voluntary compact in
order to create popular government - otherwise they will not be
subject to the government or its laws - and to secure the general
welfare of society. The consent of the governed, the linchpin of
democratic government, is expressed most directly through the
ballot box and indirectly through the actions of the elected
representatives in federal and state legislative bodies. That people
must employ reason in exercising their right to vote and that such
powers of reason must be predicated upon education are the
unspoken premises permeating Madison's writings.

74

75

See generally THE MIND OF THE FOUNDER: SOURCES OF THE POLITICAL
THOUGHT OF JAMES MADISON (Marvin Meyers, ed., 1973).
Id. at xxv.

Buffalo Public Interest Law Journal

Vol. XXII

1. Active Citizen Participants
One of the core principles driving democracy is the active
participation of its citizens in governance. Without them, there is
nothing - save totalitarianism or other oppressive forms of
government by one or a few. But the promise of democracy
cannot be fulfilled without an educated citizenry. Democracy in
the United States works best when it is the product of the consent
of the governed. Citizen participants in a democracy need to be
critical thinkers about the important issues on which they exercise
their right to vote.76 In order to make informed decisions about
such key matters, citizens must be able to investigate, to question,
and to examine both popular and unpopular ideas. Without
"educated" voters who are critical thinkers, political decisions
are
based simply on public opinion or popular momentary passion
rather than independent thought. Critical thinkers must be trained
in an educational system that encourages both teachers and
students to inquire, to challenge, to debate, and to arrive at wellthought-through decisions. Thus, education plays a primary role in
the quality and vitality of American democracy.

76

I use the term "critical thinkers" and "engaged learners" to
encompass the
concepts used by progressive educators. In general, they assert that
individuals should interrogate, confront, and challenge premises, ideas,
issues along the multiple axes and intersections of race, gender, class,
ethnicity, disability, and sexual orientation in order to engage actively in the
process of learning and decision-making by reflecting and acting upon
information to achieve praxis.
Through the process of examining,
challenging, and critiquing an issue from multiple positions and various
levels, an individual arrives at a deeper understanding, a more fully
informed assessment of that particular matter. See generally PAULO FREIRE,
THE PEDAGOGY OF THE OPPRESSED 30-74, 80-118 (Myra Bergman Ramos,
trans., 1970); BELL HOOKS, TEACHING TO TRANSGRESS: EDUCATION AS THE
PRACTICE OF FREEDOM 13-34, 48-58 (1994). See also William Schwartz,
Education in the Classroom, 51 J. HIGHER EDUC. 25 (1980) (applying

progressive educational concepts and techniques to graduate education in
the United States).
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2. Education's Role in a Democratic Society

One of the core goals of education at all levels is the
transmission of information about the principles and challenges of
democracy. Public education is one avenue through which society
can inculcate its youth and immigrant populations of all ages with
the ideals and norms of a democracy and the role they will play in
it as citizens. 77 At the same time, the government does not enjoy
an unfettered right to indoctrinate its students uniformly so that
they respond in a Pavlovian manner to a variety of state-mandated
doctrines. 78 Rather, the state must allow - even encourage - a
variety of views because "the freedom to differ is not limited to
things that do not matter much. That would be a mere shadow of
freedom. The test of its substance is the right to differ as to things
79
that touch the heart of the existing order."

77

78

79

See, e.g., Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1970). "The importance of
public schools in the preparation of individuals for participation as citizens,
and in the preservation of the values on which our society rests, long has
been recognized by our decisions." Id.at 76. See also Bethel Sch. Dist. v.
Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986). "The process of educating our youth for
citizenship in public schools is not confined to books, the curriculum, and
the civics class; schools must teach by example the shared values of a
civilized social order." Id. at 683. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483
(1954). "Today [public education]... is a principal instrument in awakening
the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training,
and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment." Id.
See, e.g., Betsy Levin, Educating Youth for Citizenship: The Conflict
Between Authority and Individual Rights In the PublicSchool, 95 YALE L.J.
1647 (1986) (analyzing the tensions between the government's function of
educating students for democratic citizenship and the constitutional rights of
those individuals in primary and secondary schools).
See West Va. State Bd.of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943). The
Court has also viewed the university classroom as a more open forum and
more adult than those settings in either a primary or secondary public
school. See Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972) (treating college-aged
students as adults). In the college or university setting, the Court describes
in-class speech as wide ranging, diverse. However, professors in the
classroom should neither indoctrinate their students nor incite them to
violence.
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Of particular importance to America's democracy is the
key role played by higher education. 80 In the college or university
setting, education is inextricably tied to the principle that
professors must be free to inquire, that is, to research, to challenge
ideas, to cast aside out-dated theories and dogma, and to find
solutions to a broad variety of matters that have an impact on
industry, science, economics, politics, mathematics, and society. 8 '
The college and university setting is an environment in
which ideas are tested and challenged, accepted or rejected as a
part of the institution's function as an intellectual experiment
station, a marketplace of ideas. 82 Without free and wide-ranging
research and development of theories, there will be a diminishing
return in terms of the advancement of knowledge in all sectors of
See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 273 n.14 (1981) (describing college
students as "young adults" who "are less impressionable than younger
students"). See also Bd. of Regents v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 239 n.4
(2000) (Souter, J., concurring) (opining that "the right of teaching
institutions to limit expressive freedom of students have been confined to
high schools ... whose students and their schools' relation to them are
different and at least arguably distinguishable from their counterparts in
college education." (citations omitted)).
81 Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957).
The essentiality of freedom in the community of American
universities is almost self-evident.
No one should
underestimate the vital role in a democracy that is played by
those who guide and train our youth. To impose any strait
jacket upon the intellectual leaders in our colleges and
universities would imperil the future of our Nation. No field
of education is so thoroughly comprehended by man that new
discoveries cannot yet be made. Particularly is that true in the
social sciences, where few, if any, principles are accepted as
absolutes. Scholarship cannot flourish in an atmosphere of
suspicion and distrust. Teachers and students must always
remain free to inquire, to study and to evaluate, to gain new
maturity and understanding, otherwise our civilization will
stagnate and die. Id.
82 See Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967)
(asserting that a
"classroom is peculiarly the 'marketplace of ideas.' The Nation's
future
depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure to that robust
exchange of ideas which discovers truth 'out of a multitude of tongues,
(rather) than through any kind of authoritative selection."' (citation
omitted)).
80

2003-2004

Academic Speech and the Public University

83
3

scey
society.

Simultaneously, there will be fewer solutions proposed
for social problems, fewer advances in technology and science, and
fewer resolutions to political issues.8 4
B. Modern First Amendment Theorists
1. Alexander Meiklejohn
In analyzing Supreme Court opinions and the Constitution,
theorists have long supported and embraced the concept that.
democratic values are at the heart of the First Amendment. Their
efforts to describe and devise a comprehensive theory of the First
Amendment is the point where their views begin to diverge.
Professor Alexander Meiklejohn thought that only those matters or
issues tied to the political debate were protected by the speech
clause. 85 Further, those specific political issues ought to be
determined and resolved through the power of the ballot box.86

Leaving aside the question of whether Meiklejohn crafted a
restrictive view of the scope of the First Amendment, the point is
that his analysis begins with a basic principle of democracy: the
active participation of citizens through the exercise of their voting

See Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 263 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). "It is
the business
of a university to provide that atmosphere which is most conducive to
speculation, experiment and creation." Id.
8
Id. at 262-63. "In a university knowledge is its own end, not
merely a means
to an end. ... The concern of its scholars is not merely to add and revise
facts in relation to an accepted framework, but to ever be examining and
modifying the framework itself." Id.
85 Meiklejohn's earliest theory of free speech
was criticized for its restrictive
view of speech. The problem centered on his narrow concept of the
definition of the issue. He subsequently expanded the protection of the First
Amendment to encompass both literature and the arts because they inform
the political process. See Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is
An Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. REV. 245, 262 (hereinafter Meiklejohn, The
83

First Amendment). But see Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some

FirstAmendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 20-21 (1971) (arguing that there
is no basis in principle for the protection of artistic expression). Bork posits
that the First Amendment protects only political speech, which he defines in
very narrow terms.

ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELFGOVERNMENT (1948) (hereinafter MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH).
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power. 7 Underlying this premise is his view that intellectual
freedom requires expression. Any attempts to suppress it might
produce a short-term advantage for the government; however, in
the long run, it would be deleterious: "Men need truth as they need
nothing else. In the last resort, it is only the search for and the
dissemination of truth that can keep our country safe."88 For
Meiklejohn, education was essential to the democratic process:
"Education, in all its phases, is the attempt to inform and cultivate
the mind and the will of the citizen. Freedom of education, thus,
we all recognize is a basic postulate in the planning of a free
society. 89
2. Thomas Emerson
Echoing the theme of the citizen participant, Professor
Thomas Emerson posited that voters would be more likely to
accept and adopt decisions that had been developed out of their
participation through the ballot box. 90 Under his theory, citizens
were free to form their own beliefs and talk about them openly,
beyond the narrow confines of political issues; it was a matter of
self-fulfillment. Therefore, to suppress expression was to court
disaster because the citizens' attention would be directed away
from important and vital issues. Emerson observed that "...the
87

But see Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory,

88

government is unworkable for several reasons. Because American society
is no longer a manageable size, it is mass media and big government that
are the main players and not the individual citizen. Thus, the major media
players are the ones who will keep a check on government.
See MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH, supra note 86, at 57-59.
Meiklejohn, The FirstAmendment, supra note 85, at 245; see also id. at
263.
The primary social fact which blocks and hinders the success

1977 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 521. Blasi theorizes that the model of self-

89

of our experiment in self-government is that our citizens are

not educated for self-government. We are terrified by ideas,
rather than challenged and stimulated by them. Our dominant
mood is not the courage of people who dare to think. It is the
timidity of those who fear and hate whenever conventions are
questioned. Id.
90

THOMAS 1. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREE ExPRESSIoN 7 (1970).
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process of open discussion, far from causing society to fly apart,
stimulates forces that lead to greater cohesion ... [and] rests upon
the concept of political legitimation."9 ' It is through this process
of participation that individuals fully comprehend their stake in a
democratic society. Thus, for Emerson, the need for discussion,
including discord, is an integral part of the free expression that is
necessary to the functioning of a democracy.
3. Kent Greenawalt
Similarly, Professor Kent Greenawalt has wrestled with the
question of where and how to draw the boundaries of the free
speech clause in a liberal, democratic society. 92 His analysis urges
an examination of multiple factors that influence the reasons for
permitting or restricting free expression under two broad-based
rationales: consequentialism and nonconsequentialism. For the
consequentialist, "truth discovery, interest accommodation and
social stability, exposure and deterrence of abuses and of authority,
autonomy and personality development, and liberal democracy"
are the operative concepts in any theory of free expression. 93 The
nonconsequentialist, however, asserts that the social contract,
limited government, autonomy and rationality, dignity and
equality, and the marketplace of ideas are the central tenets of free
speech theory. 94 Under either or both of these rationales,
Greenawalt suggests that there are two crucial components of
American democracy: an appropriate, legitimate political process
and an informed electorate. The government's ability to sort
through political ideas is suspect and, therefore, free speech is

91

Id. at 12. See also Jennifer Elrod, ProtectingJournalistsfrom Compelled
Disclosure: A Proposalfor a FederalStatute, 7 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB.

92

93
'

POL'Y 115, 131-35 (2003-04) (discussing the importance and value of
informed decision-making, autonomy, and active participation by citizens in
a democracy).
Kent Greenawalt, Free Speech Justifications, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 119
(1989).
Id. at 130-47.
Id. at 147-54.
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necessary to ensure a liberal democracy
through the exposition and
95
matters.
political
of
discussion
4. Laurence Tribe
Other scholars, for example Professor Laurence Tribe, have
explicated theories of the First Amendment. Tribe disagrees with
the details of Meiklejohn's conceptualization of free speech
modeled on rationality and intellect because emotional and
expressional needs are overlooked.96 These qualities play an
important role in any theory of free speech. However, Tribe's
views are not incompatible with Meiklejohn's oft-repeated theme
of democracy and citizen participation. Tribe is arguing for a
broader vision of free speech; one that incorporates the
intertwining and multiple strands of theory in order to weave a
97
more textured understanding of the First Amendment.
5. Steven Shiffrin
More recently, Professor Steven Shiffrin has articulated
another theory of the First Amendment. His organizing principle
is the concept of the dissenter in the tradition of Ralph Waldo
Emerson or Walt Whitman. 98 A dissenter is one who "criticizes
95

Id. at 146. Greenawalt posits that consequentialism incorporates the
theories of John Milton and John Stuart Mill who argued that the discovery
of truth was the major rationale for permitting free expression. This ideal is
reflected in the opinions of Justices Holmes and Brandeis.
Nonconsequentialism looks to the theory of the social contract as articulated

by John Locke. Individuals consent or agree to be governed but the power
of the government is quite circumscribed. Greenawalt also asserts that it is
often difficult to draw bright lines of distinction between these two concepts

since they blend into one another.
H. TRIBE,

96

LAURENCE

97

Id.at 787-89.

98

STEVEN

B.

AMERICAN CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW

787 (2d ed. 1988).

SHIFFRIN, THE FIRST AMENDMENT, DEMOCRACY, AND ROMAN

CE 5 (1993).

A major purpose of the first amendment ...
is to protect the
romantics - those who would break out of the classical forms:
the dissenters, the unorthodox, the outcasts.
The first
amendment's purpose and function in the American polity is
not merely to protect negative liberty, but also affirmatively to
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' 99
existing customs, habits, traditions, institutions, or authorities."
Shiffrin contends that those who are the outsiders or the dissidents
ought to be the focus of the judiciary's analysis of First
Amendment speech claims in order to ensure vigorous protection
for their expression. For a vibrant democracy, under Shiffrin's
theory, the freedom of thought and the right to speak openly are
the core elements. This is especially true for those who voice
00
differing or dissenting or minority views in a democratic society.'

C. Democratic Parallels in Higher Education
Parallels exist between the principles of democracy and
those of higher education, including the need and respect for
dissenting voices, critical inquiry, dissemination of information,
and expansion of knowledge. The freedom of faculty members to
speak, theorize, and research on a wide variety of matters is
essential to the vitality of the university or college.'
A broad
spectrum of viewpoints plays a central role in developing and
refining the skills of students and other academics, in weighing and
choosing among competing ideas or theories or values. The value
of dissident, different, outsider, or minority viewpoints is a key
component of the creation, maintenance, and growth of a robust,
broad-based educational program. 10 2 Further, when scholars
challenge the status quo by creating new theories or revising
traditional concepts, knowledge is enhanced and enlarged. The
benefits of such diverse theorizing flow into the larger society in a
number of ways.
They can assist members from varying
backgrounds to understand and accept one another. They may help
to reduce or eliminate barriers between and among different
groups. They allow for the discovery and resolution of a wide
range of societal problems. They can spur broader economic
the
sponsor the individualism, the rebelliousness,
antiauthoritarianism, the spirit of nonconformity within all of
us. Id
99 Id. at xi.
'oo Id. at 87-108.
01 See Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957).
102 Id. at 251 (viewing the absence of dissident speakers as a sign of a social
ill).
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opportunities for individuals and communities through the creation
of new jobs, products, and industries.
Many applaud and support the goals or aims of a broadbased and diverse educational program. However, the realization
of such programs has not been without its critics because there are
deep divisions and disagreements about what constitutes the
appropriate breadth and depth of the diversity on campuses. Often,
these differences have prompted professors to turn to the federal
courts when they believe their rights have been violated.
IV. THE SUPREME COURT AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM
A. Free Speech Jurisprudence
During the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, the
Supreme Court was silent on the issue of free speech, in general,
and academic freedom, in particular, as individual rights. The
constitutional challenges to the Espionage Act of 1917 and the
Sedition Act of 1918 brought free speech claims to the forefront of
the Court's docket.' 0 3 Although those cases involving anti-war
agitators did not result in victories for those who claimed their
right of free expression had been abridged, they marked the
beginning of the Court's modem First Amendment jurisprudence.
Moreover, of particular relevance to this discussion, the
Court has never directly decided a case that turns upon academic
freedom. At best, the Court has offered a number of statements, in
dicta, with regard to the importance of higher education and
103

See, e.g., Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919); Debs v. United
States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919); Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204
(1919); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919). I use these cases to
mark the point at which speech clause cases began to be a part of the
Supreme Court's jurisprudence. There was, however, a vibrant free speech
tradition in America prior to these World War I cases in the view of some
scholars.
See generally MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, FREE SPEECH, THE
PEOPLE'S "DARLING" PRIVILEGE:
STRUGGLES FOR FREEDOM OF
EXPRESSION IN AMERICAN HISTORY (2000); DAVID M. RABBAN, FREE
SPEECH IN ITS FORGOTTEN YEARS (1997); RUSSELL B. NYE, FETTERED
FREEDOM: CIVIL LIBERTIES AND THE SLAVERY CONTROVERSY, 1830-1860

(1972). See also Michael T. Gibson, The Supreme Court and Freedom of
Expression From 1791 to 1917, 55 FORDHAM L. REV. 263 (1986).
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academic freedom in relation to democracy." ° Prior to the advent
of the public employee speech doctrine in the late 1960s, disputes
involving university professors and the issue of academic freedom
reached the Supreme Court as a result of a challenge to either a
loyalty oath or a legislative investigation in the 1950s and
1960s.05 In either situation, the focus of these cases was the
underlying notion of subversion of democratic principles, of
disloyalty to the nation, and of potential treason. Often, these cases
were more closely related to the freedom of association since the
controversies inevitably raised questions about those with whom
an academic had associated through membership in a political
party or organization. In that era, it was the fear of communism
that prompted Congressional investigations of many teachers in all
levels of education.

104

105

See TRIBE, supra note 96, § 12-4, at 812-13 n.32. Tribe points out that
although the Court has not expressly given academic freedom its own
unique category, it has accorded the principle some importance. See also
Bd. of Regents v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 237 (2000) (Souter, J.,
concurring) (stating that academic freedom encompasses university
autonomy over pedagogy and individual rights of speech and association).
Prior its 1968 decision in Pickering v.
Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968),
the Court employed the term "academic freedom" in only eight cases.
See
Whitehill v. Elkins, 389 U.S. 54 (1967) (refusal by professor in Maryland
public university to take state loyalty oath); Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents,
385 U.S. 589 (1967) (refusal by members of faculty of a New York State
public university to sign a loyalty oath); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360
(1964) (refusal of faculty members of Washington State university to swear
a loyalty oath); Yellin v. United States, 374 U.S. 109 (1963) (legislative
investigation of steel worker in which dissent mentions academic freedom);
Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960) (Arkansas public school and
university teachers refusal to sign loyalty affidavit); Barenblatt v. United
States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959) (federal legislative investigation of university
professor and his refusal to answer certain questions about his political
beliefs and associations); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957)
(state legislative investigation of university professor and his refusal to
answer questions about his political associations); Adler v. Bd. of Educ.,
342 U.S. 485 (1952) (public school teachers challenge New York State
loyalty oath). In each instance, the plaintiffs raised the issue of their right
of free speech.
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B. Academic Freedom as Dicta
1. Loyalty and Intellectual Freedom
The first appearance of the term academic freedom in a
Supreme Court opinion is found in the dissent of Adler v. Board of
Education, decided in 1952.106 Justice Douglas, joined by Justice
Black, opposed New York's Feinberg Law which conditioned the
employment of public school teachers upon the signing of a loyalty
oath. Although the Court upheld the law, Justice Douglas
disagreed and pointed out that "[t]here can be no real academic
freedom ...
[w]here suspicion fills the air and holds scholars in line
for fear of their jobs, there can be no free exercise of intellect.
Supineness and dogmatism take the place of inquiry."' 10 7 For
Justice Douglas, the purpose of education was the pursuit of truth wherever it might lead - rather than the reproduction of robotic
students who simply repeated the dogma of the day.
This same view of education (as a process of truth seeking)
was echoed in dicta by the majority in Sweezy v. New
Hampshire.'°8 The Court said that the freedom of inquiry was the
essence of the university community and to interfere with it would
endanger society. At issue was whether the state attorney general
of New Hampshire could force a university professor to disclose
the contents of one of his guest lectures at a public university and
his knowledge about a minority political party and its members. A
close reading of the opinion reveals that although the Court looked
at the issues of political association, free speech, and the state's
infringement on individual liberty, it decided the case on the basis
of due process. Even though the Court commented on academic
freedom, it did not explain the requisite parameters of that concept.
At best, the Court provided some general statements about the
necessity for such freedom within the academic setting so that the
'06
107

'08

342 U.S. at 508 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
Id. at 510-11. "This system of spying and surveillance
with its
accompanying reports and trials cannot go hand and hand with academic
freedom. It produces standardized thought, not the pursuit of truth. Yet it
was the pursuit of truth which the First Amendment was designed to
protect." Id.
354 U.S. at 250.
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process of investigation and dissemination of ideas would remain
unrestricted.
The Court reiterated its view of the necessity of intellectual
freedom in Keyishian v. Board of Regents, striking down New
York's requirement that public university professors sign a loyalty
Although the Court
oath as a condition of their employment.
asserted that academic freedom was "a special concern of the First
Amendment," it did not take the next step of elucidating the rough
contours of the concept." 10
2. Freedom from Witch Hunts
In these early cases that mention academic freedom, the
Court's central concern was to halt the state and federal witchhunts which sought to ferret out and purge alleged subversive
persons, mostly communists, from all levels of public education.
The requirement that a primary or secondary public school teacher
or college or university professor sign or swear an oath of loyalty
to the nation had little to do with the principles of education or
academic freedom (teaching or learning freedom) as posited by
educators and the guidelines of the AAUP. Instead, the question of
loyalty to the nation centered on political activity, that is, with
whom did one associate as a political affiliation. Thus, while the
Court sought to preserve the freedom of political association by
striking down state loyalty oaths, intellectual freedom for
professors still lacked protection of its own.
Although the Court referred to academic freedom in these
several opinions, it did not fashion either a definition or a standard
for assessing it. The Court has continued to employ the term, but
has yet to provide any meaningful lines of demarcation."' Thus,
the question of protection for the speech of academics remains
unresolved. Even though the concept of academic freedom has

09 385 U.S. 589 (1967).

10
"'

Id. at 603.

See, e.g., Southworth, 529 U.S. at 238-39 (Souter, J., concurring) (stating
that although the Court has deferred to the autonomy of public colleges and
universities, neither students nor teachers are entirely without First
Amendment protection in such settings).
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little legal traction, it is the principle that professors often claim
has been violated when they sue their home institutions.
V. THE SUPREME

COURT AND PUBLIC EMPLOYEE SPEECH

A. No Speech Rights for Employees - McAuliffe
The nexus between free speech and public employees did
not reach the docket of the Supreme Court until 1968 when Marvin
Pickering sued his local school officials. 1 2 Prior to Pickering v.
Board of Education, the long-standing rule involving the right of
free speech for public employees was found in an early opinion of
Justice Holmes when he sat on the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court. 113 The Mayor of New Bedford had fired a policeman,
McAuliffe, because the officer had violated a local police
regulation banning political participation through solicitation of
money or membership in a political committee by members of the
force. McAuliffe sued, claiming - among other things - that his
right of free speech and of association had been abridged by his
termination.1 Justice Holmes, speaking for a unanimous court,
would not countenance such a claim. "The petitioner may have a
constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no right to be a
policeman."' 15 Thus, public employees were without the right of
free expression.

112 391 U.S. 563 (1968).

113McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216 (1892).

See generally

114

William W. Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-PrivilegeDistinction in
Constitutional Law, 81 HARV. L. REv. 1439 (1968). See also Kathleen M.
Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REv. 1413 (1989)
(modem view of same doctrine).
Id.

115

Id. at 220.

There are few employments for hire in which the servant does
not agree to suspend his constitutional rights of free speech as
well as of idleness by the implied terms of his contract. The
servant cannot complain, as he takes the employment on the
terms which are offered him. On the same principle the city

may impose any reasonable condition upon holding offices
within its control. Id.
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B. Employee Speech Gains Protection - Pickering
The principle that employees surrendered their free speech
rights when accepting a position in the public sector remained the
general rule until 1968 when the Court held that a high school
teacher, Marvin Pickering, had been improperly fired."i 6 Pickering
had been terminated because he had written a letter to the editor of
the local newspaper that was critical of the performances of the
local school board (the Board) and the superintendent of schools
(the Superintendent). 117 In particular, Pickering asserted that they
had poorly handled two prior bond proposals for raising and
allocating school funds. Other articles on the same topic appeared
in the newspaper. One was written by the teachers' union; another
was authored by the Superintendent. Both took a favorable view
of the bond proposal. Pickering's letter, however, prompted his
dismissal by the Board, despite the fact that his missive was
greeted with "massive apathy and total disbelief' by all except the
members of the Board.' 18
Turning to the jurisprudential underpinnings of the First
Amendment, the Court held that individuals who were public
employees enjoyed constitutional protection for their comments on
matters of public concern; the same protection accorded to private
citizens. This was true even though some of the comments made
by a public employee might be directed toward his or her
supervisor and might also be unflattering. The primary concern for
the Court was the potentially chilling effect on speech where a
person speaks out in her role as a citizen. This premise rests upon
the democratic ideal that all citizens should engage in "free and
unhindered debate on matters of importance."
Indeed, this
principle initially outweighed any other consideration.
The
Court's new test balanced the interest of the public employee
(acting as a citizen) in speaking about matters of public concern

116
'

"8

391 U.S. at 563.
Id. at 566.

Id. at 570.
"9 Id. at 573.
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and of the government
(acting as an employer) in delivering its
20
services efficiently.

The Court accorded Pickering the same status as any
ordinary, private citizen because his comments were, at best, only
tangentially connected with his employment as a school teacher.
Neither Pickering's co-workers nor his immediate supervisors
were the targets of his letter and, thus, according to the Court, there
were no problematic issues of discipline or disharmony in the
workplace. Additionally, Pickering did not hold a high-level
position that necessitated either personal loyalty to or
confidentiality regarding an immediate superior. There was no
evidence that Pickering's letter prevented him from carrying out
his teaching duties. The Court reached these conclusions even
though some of Pickering's statements were, in part, erroneous.
These comments were matters of public concern about which
Pickering and the Board had differing opinions, in the Court's
view.
A key point is the Court attached great importance to the
principle that an informed citizenry was crucial to the functioning
of a democratic society. The Court concluded "that the interest in
the school administration [sic] limiting teachers' opportunities to
contribute to the public debate is not significantly greater than its
interest in limiting similar contributions by any member of the
general public."' 2 1 The Court's primary emphasis was the core
democratic principle that matters of public importance must be
openly discussed and debated by citizens, including those who are
employed within the public school system.

120
2

Id.
Id. One difficulty posed by the decision is the lack of a uniform standard

for judging such cases. The Court did, however, set forth some general
factors that could be taken into account. These included: 1) the
maintenance of discipline by immediate supervisors; 2) the need for
harmony in the workplace among co-workers; 3) the requirement of
confidence and loyalty where relevant to a particular position; and 4) the

inability of the employee to carry out his duties. Id. at 569-70, 572.
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C. Employee Speech Adds Causation Elements Mt Healthy
The Court revisited the doctrine of public employee speech
in 1977, in another case brought by a high school teacher, Fred
Doyle.' 22 When the local school board (the Board) did not renew
Doyle's teaching contract, he sued. The Board's action was the
result of its review of several negative incidents involving Doyle,
including a telephone call to a local radio station.' 23 During this
call, Doyle revealed the gist of an internal memorandum from the
school's principal to its teachers, discussing the dress and
appearance of the teachers and their connection to the garnering of
public support of a local bond issue. Turning the information into
a news item, the disk jockey made an announcement about the
teachers' dress code over the public airways.
Addressing again the issue of balancing the interest of the
public employee and that of the government, the Court reviewed a
new variation: whether the dismissal of a teacher was permissible
on grounds other than those which were constitutionally protected;
it answered in the affirmative. A public employee could not avoid
dismissal by claiming First Amendment protection where there
were other appropriate reasons upon which the employer had based
its decision. W The Court crafted a two-pronged procedural test.
An employee had to demonstrate that his speech was protected and
that it was the substantial motivation for the employer's action.
Once the plaintiff met his burden, the employer would have to
rebut it by showing that it would have dismissed the employee on
other legitimate grounds.
122
123

Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
Id. at 281-82. Doyle was also involved in other incidents and complaints.

He was the subject of a disciplinary complaint for calling students "sons of
bitches" and making obscene gestures to female students on school
124

premises.
Id. at 285. The Court remanded the case for a further determination because
it could not tell whether the Board had met its burden. Doyle demonstrated
that his speech was constitutionally protected and that it was the motivating
factor for the non-renewal of his contract. The Board, however, did not
show that its decision not to rehire was based upon unprotected conduct on
Doyle's part.
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The issue of whether a public employee's speech on
matters of public concern was protected in a private conversation
between an employee and her immediate supervisor was addressed
in a later case. 125 The comments were deemed to be protected
expression. 26 A second case held that a private conversation
between two lower-level employees in a non-public area of the
workplace was also constitutionally protected speech. 127 However,
the Court's central principles for analyzing such claims were
narrowed in the early 1980s and mid-1990s.
D. Contraction of Employee Speech Protection Connick and Waters
1. Standard Shifted in Favor of Employer Connick
The most significant alteration of the doctrine of public
employee speech occurred in the early 1980s. Sheila Myers, an
assistant district attorney in New Orleans, resisted her impending
transfer from one section of criminal court to another. Feeling
frustrated by the turn of events, Myers prepared and distributed a
questionnaire to her office colleagues regarding the policies and
decision-making practices within the district attorney's office. In
response, the district attorney fired her for her failure to obey his
transfer order and for her insubordination in handing out her
questionnaire. Myers brought suit, asserting that her speech was
protected because the effective functioning of the prosecutor's
office in New Orleans was a matter of public concern. 128 The
125
126

127

128

Givhan v. W. Line Cons. Sch. Dist, 439 U.S. 410 (1979).
Id. at 412. A teacher, Bessie Givhan, had approached her direct supervisor,
the high school principal, to express her concerns over the racially
discriminatory employment policies of the local school district. At the time,
the district was under a court-imposed desegregation order. The principal
had fired Givhan, characterizing her speech as 'insulting,' 'hostile,' 'loud,'
and 'arrogant."' Id.
See Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378 (1987) (comments by one clerical
worker to another in a constable's office during the course of a private
conversation and in a non-public area were protected by the speech clause).
Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983).

2003-2004

Academic Speech and the Public University

lower federal courts agreed that her speech was insulated by the
First Amendment.
The Supreme Court, however, reversed, and upheld the
discharge.
Despite the district court's finding that Myers'
statement, taken as a whole, raised matters of public concern, the
Court characterized the questionnaire as merely personal. 129 Once
it was labeled as personal, the questionnaire was not a matter of
public concern and was, therefore, devoid of constitutional
protection. After casting the questionnaire as personal, the Court
easily found in favor of the public employer.'13 Because the case
was reduced to the status of an ordinary employment decision, the
Court quickly and deferentially stepped aside, noting that
personnel matters are best left to the employer.
This approach creates at least two problems. First, it
ignores or discounts the fact that most public employees who raise
concerns are talking about generally intertwined matters of public
and personal importance. It is unlikely that an employee would
separate or compartmentalize such comments into those two
categories. Second, it elevates - even overestimates - the public
employer's skill in assessing whether a statement is a matter of
public concern or simply one of a personal nature. If the employer
is the one who determines this pivotal issue, it is more likely that
the employee's speech will be denominated as personal.
The Court premised its opinion on what it called the
misapplication of Pickering by the lower federal courts. Absent
any constitutionally protected speech, "government officials
should enjoy a wide latitude in managing their offices, without
intrusive oversight by the judiciary in the name of the First
Amendment."' 13 1 This was so even though some terminations
might be either unfair or mistaken, assuming there was no
32
violation of other statutory or contractual provisions.1
It can, however, be argued that the Court misread
Pickering's standard when it placed primary emphasis on the
129

507 F. Supp. 752 (E.D. La.), affid, 654 F.2d 719 (5th Cir.1981), rev'd, 461

130

U.S. 138 (1983).
461 U.S. at 148 (characterizing Myers' questionnaire as nothing more than

her dissatisfaction over her transfer).
131 Id. at 146.
132 Id. at 146-47.
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requirement of context: the time, place, and manner of the speech
in question. 133 Connick radically shifted the balancing test. The
standard centered on the employer's interest in efficient operations
rather than the public employee's interest in speaking on matters of
public concern. The result was the speech in question slipped from
a primary to a secondary position, 13 it was no longer on the same
plane as that of a private citizen. 135 As the dissent observed: "The
First Amendment affords special protection to speech that may
133

'3

Id. at 147-48. "Whether an employee's speech addresses a matter of public
concern can be determined by the content, form, and context of a given
statement, as revealed by the record as a whole." After looking at the
questionnaire, the Court said that because Myers did not allege that the
prosecutor's office was not fulfilling its duties and was not performing
efficiently, she was simply upset on a personal level. Id. at 148. Further,
the Court placed a great deal of weight on the efficiency of the employer's
operations and the relationship between Myers and her immediate
supervisor. Id. at 151-52. At the same time, the Court paid little attention to
Myers' assertion that she and other attorneys were forced to work for
Connick's reelection campaigns. Id.at 149.
Id. at 159 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court had created a
standard in which the context of the statement is examined twice).
It is beyond dispute that how and where a public employee
expresses his views are relevant in the second half of the
Pickering inquiry - determining whether the employee's
speech adversely effects the government's interests as an
employer. ... But the fact that a public employee has chosen to
express his views in private has nothing whatsoever to do with
the first half of the Pickering calculus - whether those views
relate to a matter of public concern. Id.
Id. at 151. Under Pickering,the primacy of the public employee's interest
was the first prong to be examined. Additionally, the Court permitted
critical comments by a public employee with regard to his or her supervisor.
The Court set a high bar, requiring the public employer or supervisor to
meet the "reckless disregard" standard of the New York Times.
The public interest in having free and unhindered debate on
matters of public importance - the core value of the Free
Speech Clause of the First Amendment - is so great that it has
been held that a State cannot authorize the recovery of
damages by a public official for defamatory statements
directed at him except when such statements are shown to
have been made either with knowledge of their falsity or with
reckless disregard for their truth or falsity. Id. at 573, citing
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964).

2003-2004

Academic Speech and the Public University

inform public debate about how our society is governed regardless of whether it actually becomes the subject of a public
36
controversy."1
In addition to changing the focus of the interest analysis,
Connick significantly altered the standard for disruption. This is a
serious problem because of the potential for chilling speech.
Under Pickering,the test mandated an actual rather than a potential
disruption in the workplace. 137 Connick's standard elevates the
employer's subjective belief of a potential disruption or harm in
the working relationship. The district court found that the
questionnaire did not result in a disruption in the relationship
between Myers and her supervisors. The Court, however, ignored
the neutral fact-fmder's result, relying upon the public employer's
subjective judgment of the potential for interruption or
disruption.'
The potential disruption standard invariably favors
and reinforces the employer's interest over the employee's. A
Connick, 461 U.S. at 159-60 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Although not all
speech is susceptible of First Amendment protection, the dissent argued that
judges are in a better position to assess whether speech is a matter of public
concern by looking at the employee's interest in making statements on
matters of public concern.
137 The standard for disruption was first articulated
in Tinker v. Des Moines
Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508-09 (1969) (upholding the free
speech rights of middle and high school students to wear black arm bands as
a silent protest against the Vietnam War).
[An] undifferentiated fear or apprehension is not enough to
overcome the right of freedom of expression. Any departure
from absolute regimentation may cause trouble. Any variation
from the majority's opinion may inspire fear. Any word
spoken in class, in the lunchroom, or on the campus may start
an argument or cause a disturbance. But our Constitution says
we must take this risk, Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 69
(1949); and our history says that it is this sort of hazardous
freedom - this kind of openness - that is the basis of our
national strength and of the independence and vigor of
Americans who grow up and live in this relatively permissive,
often disputatious, society. Id.
138 Connick, 461 U.S. at 168. "If the employer's
judgment is to be controlling,
public employees will not speak out when what they have to say is critical
of their supervisors." Id Justice Brennan urged the Tinker standard
as
controlling the determination of whether a material disruption had occurred.
See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508-09.
116
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public employer will likely view dissidents, whistle-blowers, and
critics as potentially disruptive and, therefore, will seek to quiet,
silence, or rid itself of these individuals on the basis that the
employee's speech might impede or disrupt the efficient delivery
of services to the public. 139 Further, the fear of being fired will
likely cause public employees to self censor. They will not speak
out about matters of public concern even though there may be
serious risks or harmful effects to the health, safety, or welfare of
the public.
2. Further Shift to Favor Employers - Waters
While Connick contracted the zone of protected speech for
public employees, the Court further reduced that protection in
Waters v. Churchill.140 During a break at a public hospital in
Chicago, two nurses and a doctor were eating dinner in a small
kitchen off the nurses' station. In a private conversation, Cheryl
Churchill and Melanie Perkins-Graham were talking about the
hospital's cross-training policy.
Perkins-Graham
was
contemplating a transfer to the Obstetrics department where
Churchill was assigned. The head of that department, Dr. Thomas
4
Koch, was also present.'1
139

140
141

The standard of a mere apprehension of disruption is a powerful tool. From
the public employer's position, "potential disruption" permits the employer
a wide margin of discretion and control over the workplace, requiring a
uniformity of viewpoint when dealing with members of the public,
delivering services, and speaking to co-workers or supervisors. From the
public employee's position, it is more likely that an employer will
"discover" an apprehension of potential disruption when there is an
employee who speaks out on any matter with which the employer disagrees
or where there is an employee who is an irritant or an annoyance.
511 U.S. 661 (1994).
Dr. Koch was vigorously and vociferously opposed to the hospital's crosstraining policy. He was Churchill's boyfriend at the time and had
complained of the under-staffmg of the obstetrical department which he
supervised. The Seventh Circuit noted that it was the association between
Koch and Churchill that irritated Kathleen Davis, Vice-President of
Nursing, and Cynthia Waters because Churchill had provided Koch with
information that he could not have otherwise obtained. In turn, Koch
utilized this information in his efforts to improve nursing care within his
department. See 977 F.2d 1114, 1118 (7h Cir. 1992).
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The parties dispute what was actually said during the
course of that conversation. 142
The hospital claimed that
Churchill's comments were negative statements directed toward
Cynthia Waters, Churchill's immediate supervisor. 43 In contrast,
Churchill asserted that she spoke mainly about the hospital's crosstraining policy which she believed would undermine patient care
and safety. 144 In the end, Churchill was discharged and she sued.
The district court held that the speech at issue was unprotected
under the First Amendment but the Seventh Circuit reversed. 145
Using the Connick standard, it found that Churchill's speech rights
had been violated by the hospital. The court of appeals said that an
examination of the issue had to begin with what the employee
1 46
actually said rather than what the employer thought was said.
After reversing the Seventh Circuit, the Supreme Court
constructed its own explanation of the relevant standard. The test
was framed in a narrow fashion with two prongs: the first required
that the speech at issue be a matter of public concern; the second,
that the public employee's interest in commenting on matters of
public concern not override any injury from such statements to the
public employer's interest in providing efficient delivery of its
services.147 The new standard allowed any potential harm from the
142
143

'4

145

511 U.S. at 664.
Id. at 665. The hospital gleaned its version of the facts from an
eavesdropping nurse, Mary Lou Ballew. She heard only intermittent
portions of the conversation at issue because she was on duty and
responding to patients. She later reported what she had overheard to Waters
and Davis. They spoke with Ballew on two occasions before talking with
Perkins-Graham. The two supervisors never spoke to Churchill about the

incident.
Id. at 666. While admitting that she had been critical of Davis' crosstraining policy, Churchill claimed that her comments were directed to that
policy which she characterized as a staffmg move to cover personnel
shortages rather than an actual training program designed to teach skills and
procedures. Churchill believed that the cross-training policy would threaten
the care and well-being of patients and she had advised both Waters and
Davis of her concerns over the course of a number of months.
731 F. Supp. 311 (D. Ill. 1990); see also 511 U.S. at 667 (agreeing with the

district court that the potential disruptiveness of Churchill's speech stripped

4
147

her statements of protection no matter which version was accepted as true).
511atU.S.
at 667.
Id.
668-69.
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employee's speech to be the basis for the denial of First
Amendment protection as seen from the perspective of the public
employer.
The Court explained that "reliable procedures" are a
necessary accompaniment to the substantive standards of the First
Amendment. 148 Specific procedures apply to the government
when it acts in its role as a sovereign. However, when the
government is an employer, these protective standards are relaxed
and significantly lowered. 149 Thus, not every procedural safeguard
for speech is required in every situation in the public workplace. 150
As a public employer, the government may silence its
employees in a variety of circumstances that would be
constitutionally impermissible when it acts as a sovereign.
Additionally, public employers are permitted to predict reasonably
whether the employee's speech might potentially disrupt the
efficiency of services provided. 15 1 The Court, however, did not
adequately define what might be deemed a reasonable prediction
of either harm or disruption in the public workplace. This
deferential standard, favoring the employer, will likely lead to
wide variations in the definition and the application of reasonable
predictions.
Public employers determine what, if any,
148

Id. at 669 (explaining that the procedures included "a particular allocation
of the burden of proof, a particular quantum of proof, a particular type of
appellate review ").
I9
d. at 678.

Of course, there will often be situations in which reasonable
employers would disagree about who is to be believed, or how
much investigation needs to be done, or how much evidence is
needed to come to a particular conclusion. In those situations,
many different courses of action will necessarily be
reasonable. Only procedures outside the range of what a
reasonable manager would use may be condemned as
unreasonable. Id.
"50 Id. at 671-72. The Court draws a distinction between the government's role
when it serves as a sovereign and when it acts as a proprietor. In the former
role, the government is restrained to a greater degree in terms of limiting its
citizens' free expression while the latter role allows it far more latitude in
restricting its employees' speech.
1
Id. at 673 (according greater deference to public employer's predictions
of
harm to justify speech restrictions for its employees).
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investigations and procedures are required.1 52 This, too, is likely to
result in wide-ranging interpretations by public employers when
they decide whether an inquiry ought to be made into the
comments uttered by one of their employees.
As its analytical starting point, the Court utilized Connick's
time, place, and context standard. Looking at context, the Court
said that in numerous instances, the government as employer must
be able to silence or restrict the speech of its employees. To
53
illustrate its point, the Court relied on Cohen v. California.
While it was permissible for Cohen to walk through the public
hallway of a courthouse wearing a jacket that read "Fuck the
Draft," he could not do so in the public workplace as an employee
when speaking either to members of the public or to his coworkers. 154

The result of Waters is the elevation of the government
employer's interest in efficiency over any other value, including
expression by public employees. 155 The decision further restricts,
or nearly eliminates, public employees' opportunities to speak
152

153
154

Id. at 671.

"[T]he propriety of a proposed procedure must turn on the
particular context in which the question arises -- the cost of the procedure
and the relative magnitude and constitutional significance of the risks it
would decrease and increase." Id.
403 U.S. 15 (1971).
Id. at 24-25. In some circumstances, it may be true that a public employee
could not use such an expletive. However, Cohen is an inappropriate
choice for a number of reasons. By using the extraordinarily offensive
word (fuck) from Cohen as an example, the Court has subtly and
inextricably linked Churchill's statements with two unseemly and negative
images: fornication and unpatriotic (implicitly disloyal) behavior - either
based upon the sentiments expressed or the act of war resistance. For many,
the images of the divisive agitation between pro- and anti-war activists in
the United States during the Vietnam War was an especially difficult
chapter in American history. Further, Cohen's sentiments struck many as
an abomination because thousands of young adults had made the ultimate
sacrifice for democracy - losing their lives.
155 511 U.S. at 675.
The key to First Amendment analysis of government
employment decisions, then, is this: The government's interest
in achieving its goals as effectively and efficiently as possible
is elevated from a relatively subordinate interest when it acts
as a sovereign to a significant one when it acts as employer.
Id.
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about matters of public concern while in the workplace. In Givhan
v. Western Line ConsolidatedSchool District, a teacher's private
conversation about racial discrimination in the school district with
her direct supervisor, on school premises, was deemed to be
protected.156 In contrast, a nurse's private conversation about
public health and patient safety with two other employees (neither
was her immediate supervisor) in a non-public area of the hospital
was not protected in Waters. This was so despite a finding that the
content of the speech at issue was a matter of public concern when
reviewed by a neutral fact finder, employing Connick's principles.
Waters undercuts two additional elements of Pickering.
The latter allowed for inaccuracy in statements made by employees
when talking about matters of public concern because an
unhindered, robust debate and an informed citizenry were of prime
importance to a democratic government.' 57 . Pickering also
permitted negative comments or criticisms with regard to the
employee's supervisors or others in policy-making positions
without punishment unless the employer could show that the
employee spoke with reckless disregard as to the truth or falsity of
158
his statements.
The Pickering Court recognized that pubic employees mix
comments on matters of public concern and criticisms of
supervisors rather than separating such statements into two
different categories. In sharp contrast, Waters allows a public
employer to look at the time and place of the speech in question,
and then decide for and by itself whether the employee's speech is
potentially disruptive to its ability to perform or carry out its
439 U.S. 410 (1979). See also supra note 126.
"' See Pickering,391 U.S. 563, 573 (1968).
158 Id. The Court relied on the standard of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964). A public official must demonstrate that the
116

alleged defamatory statements were made "either with knowledge of their
falsity or with reckless disregard for their truth or falsity." See supra note
136. See also Harry Kalven, Jr., The New York Times Case: A Note On
"The Central Meaning of the FirstAmendment," 1964 SUP. CT. REv. 191,
213 (theorizing that the breadth of such speech protection "reflects a
strategy that requires that speech be overprotected in order to assure that it
is not underprotected"). It is robust, open debate on matters of public
concern that is at the core of First-Amendment values. See also Pickering,
391 U.S. at 573.
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functions efficiently.' 59 The employer need not examine the actual
content of the speech but may determine what it thought the
employee said. 160

Thus, whether or not the employee's speech

involves matters of public concern is hardly relevant. Comments
expressing a negative view of one's supervisor are not held to
Pickering's requirement of reckless disregard. 16 1 Instead, such
criticism is viewed as proof of potential disruption and is accorded
far more importance than it otherwise ought to have. 162 In the end,
the efficiency of the workplace was elevated above comments on
matters of public concern uttered by the public employee. The
Court's justification was that "many of the fundamental maxims of
our First Amendment jurisprudence cannot reasonably be applied
' 63
to speech by government employees."'
In certain situations, we might agree that the public
employer's efficient delivery of services ought to be elevated over
the employee's comments on matters of public concern. In other
circumstances, we might have reservations about placing primary
emphasis on efficiency over statements about public concerns
involving the public's health, safety, welfare, or other such
important interests. The difficulty posed by the new standard of
Waters is that there is no longer a balancing of interests between
the public employee's speech on matters of concern to the public
159What is absent from the primary calculus in Waters is
the employee's

interest in speaking on matters of public concern. The Court focuses its
analysis on the efficiency interest of the employer and disregards the central
point of Pickering - the interest of a public employee in commenting on
matters of public concern and its role in a robust debate on such issues.
Additionally, under the restrictive standard of Connick, the Seventh Circuit
held that Churchill's comments were a matter of public concern and,
therefore, were protected. Thus, in the neutral setting of a court, the
government employer lost.
160 See Waters, 511 U.S. at 677-78 (adopting a standard
based upon what the
public employer reasonably thought was said even if the employer was
mistaken).
161

See supra notes 135 and 158.

'62

511 U.S. at 676. "But employers, public and private, often do rely on
hearsay, on past similar conduct, on their personal knowledge of people's
credibility, and on other factors that the judicial process ignores."
Id.at 672. In the end, one has to wonder whether the Court was Id.
inching its
way back to the standard of McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford in which a
public employee had no right to speak. 155 Mass. 216 (1892).
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and the employer's efficient delivery of services. The standard is
tilted and weighted in favor of the employer. Without a balance of
interests, there is the potential problem of deciding when and
where the public employer's claim of its provision of efficient
services crosses the line from service to self-serving.
E. Application of Waters to Public Higher Education Jeffries
Although Waters is problematic because its skewed
standard nearly eliminates the right of public employees to
comment on matters of public concern, the rule when applied to
public higher education is very troublesome. This is illustrated by
the case of Leonard Jeffries, the controversial tenured Black
professor at the City College of New York (CCNY), who was
caught in the wake of Waters.I64 He had been brought to CCNY 165
164

Jeffries v. Harleston, 828 F. Supp. 1066 (S.D.N.Y. 1993), afid in part and

vacated in part, 21 F.3d 1238, 1241 (2d Cir.), vacated and remanded, 513

U.S. 996 (1994), rev'd, 52 F.3d 9 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 862
(1995). The case has prompted a fair amount of scholarly commentary. See,

e.g., Chris Hoofnagle, Matters of Public Concern and the Public University
Professor, 27 J.C. & U.L. 669 (2001); Michael J. Sherman, The Leonard
Jeffries
Problem: Public
University Professor/Administrators,
ControversialSpeech, and ConstitutionalProtectionFor PublicEmployees,

30 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 651 (1999); Rachel E. Fugate, Choppy Waters Are

Forecastfor Academic Free Speech, 26 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 187 (1998);

Harry F. Tepker, Jr., and Joseph Harroz, Jr., On Balancing Scales,

165

Kaleidoscopes, and the Blurred Limits ofAcademic Freedom, 50 OKLA. L.
REV. 1 (1997); Richard H. Hiers, New Restrictions On Academic Free
Speech: Jeffries v. Harleston II, 22 J.C. & U.L. 217 (1995); Stephen A.
Newman, At Work In the Marketplace of Ideas: Academic Freedom, the
First Amendment, and Jeffries v. Harleston, 22 J.C. & U.L. 281 (1995);
Nathan Glazer, Levin, Jeffries, and the Fate of Academic Autonomy, 36
WM. & MARY L. REV. 703 (1995); Robert J. Spitzer, Tenure, Speech, and
the Jeffries Case: A FunctionalAnalysis, 15 PACE L. REV. 111 (1994).
JAMES TRAUB, CITY ON A HILL: TESTING THE AMERIcAN
DREAM AT CITY

COLLEGE 9 (1994). "City [College] is perhaps the longest running radical

social experiment in American History. ... [A]nd it became one of the great

democratizing institutions of urban culture. ... For the tens of thousands
who went there ... City College was the living emblem of the American

Dream." Id. CCNY is one of the senior colleges in the City University of
New York system of two- and four-year schools. Id.
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to head up the Black Studies Department which had been created
following demonstrations by Black and Latino students in the early
1970s. 160 Despite the fact that Jeffries had only some of the
credentials required for a tenured professor at the City University
67
of New York (CUNY), he was, nevertheless, hired with tenure. 1
From his arrival at CCNY until late 1991, Jeffries had been
elected and reelected as the Chair of Black Studies by his
departmental colleagues. 168 Their vote in June 1991 produced the
same outcome. 169 As a result, the college's President, Bernard
Harleston, had written Jeffries a congratulatory letter on July Is' in
which Harleston accepted the election without reservation. 1 0 All
this good will would change within a few weeks.
On July 20, 1991, Jeffries gave a speech (Albany Speech)
during the Empire State Black Arts and Cultural Festival in
Albany, New York. 17 1 Jeffries, a consultant to the State Education
Commissioner, talked of the need for more minority perspectives
172
to be reflected in the curriculum of the state's public schools.
The major portion of Jeffries' remarks centered on the failure of
the New York State public school curriculum to reflect the
contributions of the individuals from many different ethnic groups
who had contributed to state's growth. He asserted that education
was not neutral; it was not an isolated institution. Rather, it was
but one of several interlocking systems (racially, culturally,
economically, and politically) of oppression deployed against
'66

Id. at 238-44.

167

Id. Leonard Jeffries held masters and doctoral degrees from Columbia
University, he had been the founder of the Black Studies Department at San

Jose State University, and he had taught political science at CCNY.
However, unlike most tenured faculty, Jeffries had no scholarly
publications.
168

828 F. Supp. at 1073 n.1 (noting that Jeffries was elected and reelected
unanimously by his colleagues every three years).

169

Id. at 1072-73.

170

Id. at 1073. "1look forward to working with you and your department .... I

171

am confident that with your assistance and guidance and with the help of
your Executive Committee, we will continue to serve the students and
citizens of the City College as an educational institution of the highest
quality." Id.
See Text ofJeffries'July Speech, NEWSDAY, Aug. 19, 1991, at 3.

172

828 F. Supp. at 1073.
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Blacks. Jeffries argued that the curriculum of the state's public
schools reflected the economic, political, and legal institutions that
supported and perpetuated a system of white domination, omitting
the histories of Blacks who played a role in the state's
development. He remarked that Blacks needed to learn about their
history and their contributions to the state and the nation. 173
Interspersed with these observations, Jeffiies made a
number of statements deemed to be anti-white and anti-Semitic.
For example, he accused Jews of selling rum to Native Americans,
supporting the Spanish throne, controlling the slave trade, and
laying the groundwork for enslaving African people in the 1400s
and 1500s. He asserted that Blacks were "sun people," whites
were "ice people," and sun people were superior to all others. He
also called Diane Ravitch, a high-ranking official of the U.S.
Department of Education, a "sophisticated Texas Jew," and a
' 74
"Miss Daisy.,'
For over two weeks, there was scant attention paid and no
reaction to the Albany Speech. 175
This situation changed
dramatically in early August when the NY. Post carried a story
about Jeffries' comments. 176 The following day, the two other
major New York City dailies, the N.Y Times and Newsday, picked
up the story. 177 The headline in the former read "CUNY Professor
Criticizes Jews.' 7 8 At the same time, local, state, and federal

173

See supra note 171.

174 Id.

On July 20,1991, NY-SCAN, a local cable station in Albany, New
York,
carried the Jeffries' speech live.
176 See Assoc. PRESS, Teaneck
Professor Accused of "Teaching Hate,"
173

BERGEN REC. (NJ), Aug. 6, 1991, at A3 (noting the N.Y. POST reported on
Professor Jeffries' July 20, 1991 speech in Albany, N.Y., on Monday, Aug.
5, 1991).
177 The N.Y. Times, first reported Jeffries' Albany Speech
on Tuesday, Aug. 6,
1991, sixteen days after it took place.
See Jacques Steinberg, CUNY
Professor Criticizes Jews, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 1991, at B3; T. J. Collins,
Jews, GOP Rip Profs Racial Speech, NEWSDAY, Aug. 6, 1991, at 6.
Manuel Perez-Rivas, More Anger at City Prof,NEWSDAY, Aug. 8, 1991, at
178

6.
See
Steinberg, supranote 177.

2003-2004

Academic Speech and the Public University

politicians began clamoring for CUNY and CCNY officials to take
79
some action against Jeffries. 1
In response to mounting pressure fomented by the media
and the politicians, President Harleston wrote a letter, dated
August 8, 1991, to the CCNY faculty, indicating that an
investigation of Jeffries would be conducted once the fall semester
commenced. 180 In early September 1991, the President appointed
Dean Jeffrey Rosen, Chair of the Social Science Department, to
See, e.g., Sam I. Verhovek, Cuomo Urges CUNY to Act On Professor,N.Y.
TIMEs, Aug. 8, 1991, at BI. "Gov. Mario M. Cuomo today urged the City
University of New York to take disciplinary action against Dr. Leonard
Jeffries ... who delivered a racially charged speech at a state-sponsored
conference [in Albany] last month." Id. Vivienne Walt, Cuomo in CUNY
Fray Supports Action Against 2 Profs Over Racial Views, NEWSDAY, Aug.
9, 1991, at 3. "A college official, who did not want to be named, said
Cuomo's hard-hitting attack on Jeffries made the school rethink its
position." Id. Vivienne Walt, CUNY Studies Black Prof; College Bows to
Cuomo Plea, NEWSDAY, Aug. 9, 1991, at 3. "The City University of New
York, responding to pressure from Gov. Mario Cuomo, said yesterday it
will consider action against a black studies professor whose racially charged
remarks 'fuel the fires of bigotry and disharmony."' Id. At the time,
Governor Cuomo was considering a run for the Presidency of the United
States.
"'o See Jeffries, 828 F. Supp. at 1073 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). "I therefore,
would like
to assure you that at the beginning of the Fall semester, I will initiate a
thorough review of this situation." Id. The President's actions were
prompted in part by then-Governor Mario Cuomo's outspoken insistence
that CCNY and CUNY ought to take steps against Jeffries for his
outrageous and inappropriate statements during the Albany Speech or
explain why they were not taking any action. See Verhovek, supra note
179, at B 1. "While I cannot order the City University to do so," Mr. Cuomo
said, "it seems to me that the comments are so egregious that the City
University ought to take action or explain why it doesn't." Id The
governor's insertion of the power and prestige of his office into the
controversy over Jeffries was highly unusual; it was unprecedented. See
also Denise K. Magner, Politicians Press Officials at the City College of
New York to Punish Black-Studies Chairman for Remarks on Jews, CHRON.
HIGHER EDUC., Sept. 4, 1991, at A] 9. "Initially, Bernard W. Harleston, the
president of City College, and W. Ann Reynolds, chancellor of the CUNY
system, issued separate statements on [Jeffries' speech].
Without
mentioning Mr. Jeffries, their statements condemned bigotry but defended
the right of faculty members to express themselves. As political pressure
grew, both administrators issued new statements ... denounc[ing] [Jefries']
remarks..." Id. at A22.
179
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evaluate Jeffries' job performance.' 8 ' After one week, Rosen
reported to Provost Robert Pfeffer that Jeffries was satisfactorily
carrying out his duties of administering the Black Studies
Department. Two weeks later, Rosen again reported that Jeffries
was properly performing his duties, which were largely
ministerial.18 2 Pfeffer also produced his own written evaluation of
Jeffries in which he acknowledged that the professor carried out
his administrative duties without any negative effects from8 3either
the media.'
the Albany Speech or the ensuing publicity from
Despite the results of these three investigations, Harleston
was not satisfied.' 8 4 In October 1991, he appeared before the
CUNY Board of Trustees and asked them to reduce Jeffries' term
as Chair from three years to one. The Board agreed to the
President's request on October 28, 1991.185 The following day,
18 6 In late
Harleston advised Jeffries of the limitation on his term.
December 1991, Harleston, Rosen, and Pfeffer agreed among
themselves to hire a new chair to replace Jeffries. 8 7 By March 23,
I81 828 F. Supp. at 1074 (noting that Rosen had written that Jeffries was
fulfilling his duties).
182 Id. (describing a second evaluation by Rosen and producing the same
result).
'83 Id. "In the review, Provost Pfeffer found that Professor Jeffries performance
had not suffered as a result of the speech or the publicity surrounding it...
'Professor Jeffries appears to be functioning at least as efficiently as over
the last 10 years, and probably more so."' Id. See also id. at 1074 n.3.
President Harleston set the parameters of the inquiry by stating "[T]he ideas
[Jeffries] has expressed, including the speech he recently delivered in
Albany are not germane to the review." Id.
Id. at 1075. "Despite the positive review by the Provost, the Board of
'4
Trustees, upon the recommendation of President Harleston, voted October
28, 1991, to limit Professor Jeffries' appointment as Chair to one year rather
than the customary three-year term." Id. The district court characterized the
college's inquiries made by Rosen and Pfeffer as cursory since each man
spoke to a few professors in the Black Studies Department and a number of
other faculty members. However, because of the superficial attempts at
investigations, the core issues were never addressed and, therefore, the
university's case was fundamentally flawed in the court's view.
185 Id. (discussing the absence of any credible documentation to support the
Trustees' decision).
186

187

Id.

Id. at 1076-77 (noting with incredulity that CUNY had kept no written
records of its decision making on this significant decision).
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1992, the CUNY Trustees had voted to hire Edmund Gordon to
assume the leadership of CCNY's Black Studies Department upon
the expiration of Jeffries' abbreviated term on June 30, 1992.188
Subsequently, Jeffries sued Harleston and the Trustees, asserting
that his rights 89under the First and Fourteenth Amendments had
been violated.1
Jeffries won, following a jury trial.190 In a separate
opinion, the federal district court agreed with the jury's verdict: the
CUNY Trustees had retaliated against Jeffries on the basis of his
Albany Speech, expressive activity that was protected under the
First Amendment.' 91
The Second Circuit upheld the jury's verdict:
the
University had violated Jeffries' right of free speech. 192 Applying
Connick's principles, the court found the professor had
demonstrated that his Albany Speech was a matter of public
concern and that it was the substantial motivating factor in
CUNY's decision to shorten his term as head of the Black Studies
Department. 193 Moreover, the Second Circuit reiterated CUNY's
failure to provide any credible evidence that Jeffries' statements
had caused any disruption in CCNY's operation or created
problems between Jeffries and other faculty members. 194 The
court described the duties of departmental chairs within the CUNY
system as ministerial rather than policy making. As such, a Chair
need do no more than execute his ministerial functions, which
8

Id. at 1077-78. The district court was also troubled by the absence of any

discussion or documentation at the Trustees' meeting of Oct. 28, 1991.
Id. at 1077.
'90 21 F.3d at 124 1.
191 Id. at 1245-46 (applying Pickering-Connick factors to assess whether
189

Jeffries had demonstrated that the speech at issue was a matter of public
concern and whether the speech was a substantial or motivating factor in the

employer's actions against the plaintiff).

192

Id. at 1246.

193

Id. at 1245-46 (finding that the Albany Speech was the reason Jeffries was
demoted).

194

Id. at 1246-47. Because Jefflies' comments were matters of public concern,
CUNY had to show that the college had been substantially disrupted in its
operations or the operations had been undermined. The defendants failed to
meet their burden because they offered no relevant evidence as to any
disruption or interference.
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Jeffries did, according to three investigations conducted by Rosen
95
and Pfeffer.1

CUNY again appealed. The Supreme Court vacated and
remanded the matter to the Second Circuit, instructing it to
reconsider the case in light of Waters.'96 On remand, the court of
197
appeals held that Jeffries' speech rights had not been violated.
Thus, when the principles of Waters were applied to the facts of
Jeffries, the shift in the doctrinal standard in the former allowed for
a reversal in the latter even though there was virtually no credible
evidence offered at trial by CUNY. 198 In its post-trial opinion, the
district court pointed out that despite the offensive, inappropriate,
and disgusting nature of Jeffries' attacks on certain groups and
individuals, CUNY had failed to present any relevant evidence of
an investigation of the impact of the Albany Speech upon the
college (class disruption, discord between Jeffries and other faculty
members, Jeffries' inability to carry out his administrative or
teaching functions). ' 9 CCNY had tolerated Jeffries' behavior for
more than 20 years. 20 The court chided CUNY for offering
hearsay and self-serving statements in place of credible
evidence. 20 1 Such efforts, according to the district court, illustrated

Id. at 1247. The district court laid out a blueprint for CUNY in terms of an
appropriate investigation, listing three specific areas of inquiry for the
institution to pursue.
196 513 U.S. 996 (1994).
'9' 52 F.3d at 9. The Second Circuit did not need to address the issue of what
was said by Jeffries since there was no dispute as to the words spoken in the
Albany Speech. In contrast, the parties in Waters disagreed as to the actual
statements made by the plaintiff, Cheryl Churchill. Thus, the Second Circuit
could have distinguished the facts of Jeffries and followed its original
analysis, finding a violation of the professor's speech rights, while deeming
Waters inapplicable.
198 See 21 F.3d at 1246 (discussing Jeffries' removal while noting the absence
of disruption from his speech).
'9
See 828 F. Supp. at 1075, 1082.
200 Id. at 1097. "For the most part, ... the University inexplicably and perhaps
cowardly, chose to ignore [the indications of serious] improprieties, and
only acted against the plaintiff when the public outrage over the July 20,
1991 speech in effect forced its hand." Id.
201 Id. at 1072.
'95
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the administration's impermissible attempt to punish Jeffries for
his Albany Speech.20 2 The court went further; it pointed out that
CUNY's claim that Jeffries had suffered no harm when it removed
him as Chair was unavailing.20 3
Following Waters, the Second Circuit's standard of
disruption shifted from an "actual interference" (a more speech
protective test) to a "reasonable expectation of harm" (a less
protective standard) as seen from the perspective of the public
employer. 204 Moreover, despite the Second Circuit's assertion that
the CUNY Trustees reasonably expected a disruption because of
Jeffries' Albany Speech, it is a troubling result for a number of
reasons. 20
First, there was little or no credible evidence of any
202

203

204

205

Id. The district court admonished CUNY for its "confused and incompetent
defense," including its failure to provide "witnesses, stenographic records,
affidavits and the like," and for proffering "pious press releases and hearsay
ridden, elliptical hand-wringing memoranda from academic deans" rather
than relevant evidence. Id.
Id.
We are told that the professor has lost nothing and hence is not
irreparably harmed in his dismissal.... If the Chairmanship
meant nothing, why did the University go to such lengths in
the trial to justify its denial as a proper and just sanction for a
cavalcade of the professor's non-speech sins? If it meant
nothing, why was it bestowed upon, and indeed accepted by
one of the most eminent Black Studies scholars in America,
Edmund Gordon? Id.
52 F.3d at 14. This raises the issue of how "reasonable" is the expectation
where there has been no investigation. See also 828 F. Supp. at 1080-82
(explaining in detail the inept defense by CUNY and the incomplete
investigation by CCNY officials).
52 F.3d at 9. The Second Circuit premised its decision on the inconsistent
jury verdicts which it said were irreconcilable, stating that the jury found in
one portion of its verdict that nine of fourteen Trustees demoted Jeffries
based on their belief that the professor's speech would harm CCNY and
CUNY. Yet, the district court went to great lengths to point out the failures
of the university's attempts to proffer competent and relevant evidence at
trial. The omissions were painstakingly listed as part of the permanent
public record. See 828 F. Supp. at 1082.
Nor did the Attorney General put on the stand a single CUNY
student to testify abut possible negative effects of the speech
on the functioning of classes or the teacher-student
relationship. For example, there was no testimony from a
student who decided against taking a particular class as a
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potential disruption presented at trial by CUNY. Instead, it offered
pious press releases and self-serving statements or hearsay by
high-level university officials.2 °6 Second, CJNY had performed
no investigation of the actual or even the potential impact of
Jeffries' Albany Speech.20 7 The district court outlined three
specific areas that CUNY had failed to examine. They included:
(1) Jeffries' relationship with other members of the CCNY faculty,
including Jewish professors; (2) the potential for the stigmatization
and degradation of the Black Studies Department; and (3) the
impact upon donations by alumni and the withdrawal of such
contributions. 20 8 Third, CCNY's three evaluations of Jeffries as a
teacher and the head of a department all concluded that his
performance was satisfactory. Thus, in the wake of Waters, the
public university as an employer need not have conducted a
reasonable investigation, need not have proffered relevant credible
evidence of a potential for disruption, but need only have provided
self-serving9 comments by high-level officials to support its
2
position. 0
result of Professor Jeffries' speech. Nor did the Attorney
General put a member of the faculty on the stand who
indicated that he would have difficulty working with
Professor. Id.
206 828 F. Supp. at 1079-84 (marshaling the facts and
criticizing CUNY and its
attorneys for failing to present credible evidence to back up the university's
position).
207 Id. at 1082. "Indeed, the only official written evaluations of Professor
Jeffries' performance as Chairman of the Black Studies Department after
the July 20, 1991 speech indicate that the speech did not cause any
hampering whatsoever of the functioning of the University." Id. According
to the district court, rather than investigate the impact of the Albany Speech,
CUNY reviewed Jeffries' performance as Chair of the Black Studies
Department, determining in at least two instances that he was performing in
a satisfactory manner all of the requisite duties. Id.
208 Id. at 1075. "Such a vital inquiry was never made...." Id. The court pointed
out that there was no proof offered by either CCNY or CUNY that the
Albany Speech by Jeffries had any impact upon alumni. There was no data
and no analysis presented at trial to show that alumni donations had
declined because of Jeffries' speech.
209 Id at 1075, 1082.
The district court's opinion lays out in great detail the
myriad ways in which the defendants failed to meet their burden of proof
because they failed to submit relevant and competent evidence, they failed
to conduct a meaningful investigation, and they provided no competent
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I do not suggest that public institutions of higher learning
must continue to employ tenured professors whom the institutions
deem to be unprofessional or unfit. Rather, I argue that university
administrators must use reasonable and appropriate means of
investigation to support their decisions and actions against an
academic. Otherwise, any professor is potentially at a serious
disadvantage because an administrator can rely upon hearsay to
silence or punish a public university or college teacher for
statements that are deemed to be undesirable, irritating, unpleasant,
dissident, controversial, or potentially problematic.21 °
Contrary to the assertion by the Second Circuit, Jeffries
was punished when he was stripped of his role as Chair because he
made a polemical speech off campus. 211 His Albany Speech,
delivered at a public meeting, reflected his views and expertise on
the need for Black culture and history to be part of the curriculum
in the public middle schools of New York State. This was a
subject area that was a matter of public concern and debate since
the governor had formed a commission to study the issue.212
Jeffries was invited to speak at a Black cultural event about his
expertise on Black history and its relevance to the curriculum that
would be offered in public schools. Mixed into Jeffries' comments
were a number of anti-Semitic and anti-white statements, all of

witnesses. Thus, there was neither a reasonable investigation nor a credible

basis on which to remove Jeffries as Chair of the Black Studies Department
at CCNY.
210 Additionally, the university may lose professors
who believe that their
ability to research, write, and teach on a particular subject area may be
interfered with or restricted by administrator who has no expertise in that
field.
21
The Second Circuit asserted that Jeffries was not
harmed because he had
not lost his position as a professor or his tenure. He had been removed as
Chair of the Black Studies Department. The court failed to account for the
loss of prestige, the potential humiliation or embarrassment, professionally
and personally, as harms to Jeffries. Moreover, CUNY had tolerated
inappropriate, insensitive, anti-Semitic, and anti-white comments from
Jeffries for more than 20 years, according to the district court. 828 F. Supp.
at 1072. Thus, it was the Albany Speech delivered by Jefftries that
prompted CUNY's actions.

212

828 F. Supp. at 1073.
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which were deemed nasty, offensive, and highly inappropriate by
the district court.
Between the trial and the appellate court's opinion after
remand only one factor had changed: the legal standard applied to
the speech of public employees after Waters, holding that a public
employee's speech on matters of public concern, delivered in
private to another employee, was not protected, even if the
employee did not actually make the remarks attributed to her. 213
By creating a test as seen from the reasonable employer's
perspective, the Court allowed public employers greater leeway in
silencing and ridding themselves of troubling, troublesome, or
critical employees. 2 14 The application of Waters by the Second
Circuit to Jeffries allowed CUNY to demote a tenured professor
215
with little, if any, credible evidence.
The more worrisome aspect of Waters is the potential
chilling effect it may have upon individual academics, particularly
those who espouse dissident, different, outsider, or minority
viewpoints. Fearing that they may run afoul of public university
administrators or trustees, professors will begin to self censor so
that they stay out of harm's way. Such censorship, whether blatant
or subtle, will limit, reduce, and - ultimately - eliminate the
creation, investigation, and promulgation of new theories or
concepts because academics will want to remain free of
controversy, free of disapproval by colleagues or high-level
administrators, free from the fear that they may have overstepped
some invisible boundary of the acceptable as defined by the
university.
Fewer and fewer new ideas, investigations,
experiments, and solutions to social, economic, scientific or
political problems or concerns will be generated by professors
employed at public colleges and universities. This, in turn, could
lead to a number of professors leaving public universities and
colleges for private institutions of higher education or private
sector employment. In the long run, the brain drain will harm the
public college or university, reducing the institution's
attractiveness to talented academics and students alike.
213

511 U.S. 661 (1994).

214

Id. at 681-82.
See supra notes 201-08 and accompanying text.

215
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ACADEMIC SPEECH

A. Reasons to Protect Academic Speech
Academic speech, a zone of protection for expressive
activity directly related to a professor's scholarly expertise, is
central to the functions and goals of public higher education. If the
public university is an experiment station of the intellect, then the
academic speech of its teachers must be afforded protection under
the speech clause of the First Amendment.
Without such
insulation, college professors will be at risk. The benefits of
protecting academic speech outweigh the costs when viewed in
light of the mission and goals of an institution of higher
education.216 The public university educates and trains its
students, the future leaders of the nation, through a variety of
methods, including lectures and seminars given by professors. The
university, in its efforts to attract the best and brightest students,
will market its faculty as the core of its educational program. To
maintain its competitive edge, the university provides funding for
specific departments or programs and seeks to fill them with the
best faculty members in order to attract the brightest students and
the largest donations, grants, and research funds to the institution.
However, unless there is meaningful protection for the
academic speech of faculty at public universities and colleges,
these institutions will not remain competitive in terms of attracting
the best teachers, top students, and research monies. Within the
ranks of professors, the word will spread that the public university
is not amenable to experimentation or investigation because it
restricts the expressive activities of its academics. The top scholars
will go elsewhere. In turn, research monies and other contributions
will be reduced. Programs and departments will be adversely
affected by the loss of funding. The reduction in the number of
programs or departments will send a clear signal that innovation
and experimentation are not supported or encouraged by the public
university.
216

See supra Part III.C, discussing the role of education in a democratic
society.
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One way to ensure that the public university remains in the
forefront of higher education is to value academic speech by
protecting and encouraging it through sound administrative
policies, practices, and procedures. The hiring and granting tenure
to a diverse faculty, the creation of innovative programs and
departments, and the funding a broad and diverse range of research
projects, conferences, and symposia are a few ways in which the
public university can achieve its goal of remaining competitive.
Indeed, academic speech sits at the core of each component of the
university.
B. Academic Speech and Public Employee Speech
1. Public Higher Education
There are sound reasons for the courts to craft a separate
standard for academic speech within the pantheon of free speech
jurisprudence. First, the current version of the public employee
speech doctrine established by Waters is an uncomfortable and
uneven fit between the purposes of higher education and the
principles of the First Amendment. At the college level, the
doctrine does not respond well to the function of the institution of
public higher education that is based upon the concept and practice
of teaching and research freedom, an intellectual marketplace of
ideas and an experiment station of the mind. Because the public
employee speech doctrine requires a one-size-fits-all rule to cover
all categories of public employment, the standard must be stretched
to encompass multiple workplaces, providing a wide range of
services: health care, transportation, vehicle registration, housing,
public safety, and others.
2. Public Employers and their Tasks
The institution of public higher education differs
significantly from other government workplaces and the public
employee speech doctrine is incompatible with the purpose of a
university. The primary distinction is found in the services that the
college or university provides. The goal of post secondary
education is to educate in the broadest sense, that is, to serve as a

2003-2004

Academic Speech and the Public University

safe haven, an incubator, and a testing ground for ideas. The
higher education institution seeks to disseminate knowledge as
well as invent or create ideas and discoveries in its classrooms, in
its various other formal and informal settings, in its laboratories,
and in its service to the larger community. The university
environment is one that invites and encourages verbal exchanges,
including those that are filled with disagreement and disputation
between and among those who work, visit, or study there.217
Indeed, part of the mission of higher education is to create and
foster a variety of arenas for discussion, disputation, and debate so
that ideas are tested, retested, and refined.2' 8
While it can be argued that all government employers
provide a type or form of service to society, there are some
important distinctions that depend upon the nature or function of
the government operation. In order to both discover new theories
and create solutions to existing problems, professors charged with
carrying out those tasks require an expansive intellectual space in
which to do their work. Idea creation, formulation, and refinement
flourishes in an atmosphere that encourages exchange rather than
one that stifles or limits or suppresses it. When professors fear
(either reasonably or unreasonably) that they may be crossing the
line between acceptable and unacceptable ideas, they will likely err
on the side of caution, reining in or repressing theories that may
cause problems with high-level administrators of the university.
In contrast, other government agencies are charged with the
efficient delivery of particular services. Public hospitals, for
example, dispense medical services, including surgical procedures,
prescriptions, and other health-related treatments. The hospital-asemployer focuses on efficient delivery of these services. It is not a
workplace that is designed to encourage challenges or debates
between the service provider (the public employee) and the
recipient of such services (the patient) or between the employee (a
nurse)and his supervisor. A public hospital is not created for the
217

211

See, e.g., Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967).
See Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 261 (1957)
(Frankfurter, J.,
concurring). "It is the business of the university to provide that atmosphere
which is most conducive to speculation, experimentation, and creation." See
also The 1915 Declaration,supra note 51, at 158. "The institution of higher
education is an "intellectual experiment station." Id.
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purpose of formulating untried theories or testing new ideas while
nurse-employees are delivering health care services to its patients.
To the contrary, the institution's function is the effective and
efficient provision of health care services which are dispensed
daily by its employees with certain levels of medical training.
The same may be said of the clerk's office of a court. The
lawyers, the litigants, and the members of the public are not
permitted to engage in a verbal debate with the court employees
over the cost of filing papers and the statutory deadlines that must
be met for causes of action, and vice versa. The court employees
are required to follow certain routine procedures, including the
collection of filing fees. Although employees in both the public
hospital and the court clerk's office might engage in commentary
or discussion between and among themselves, there is a limitation
on such talk because of the nature of the tasks to be performed and
the services to be delivered where efficiency is the baseline of
measurement.
3. Public Employees and their Roles
More significantly, a professor's role in a public higher
education institution differs significantly from that of other public
sector employees. Professors are hired and tenured (or not) on the
basis of their academic expertise. They are paid to develop
theories and to speak, write, and teach about their intellectual
labors in all stages of the creation, dissemination, and
reformulation of those ideas. The intellectual efforts and products
of professors are at the core of any public university or college.
Indeed, academics are required to put their views on public display
almost daily through their scholarship, research, public statements,
classroom teaching, and community service.
Professors also play a significant role in the university's
livelihood. 219 Their intellectual production and recognition (inside
219

Justice Frankfurter opined that teachers were "the priests of democracy"
because they played such a central role in our democratic system of
governance. See Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 196-97 (1952)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring).

It is the special task of teachers to foster those habits of
open-mindedness and critical inquiry which alone make for
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and outside the university) aid the institution in attracting other
academics, students, research dollars, endowments, and - in many
instances - alumni contributions. The public university can garner
attention from the media by highlighting the work of a particular
teacher or a department. Public notice can bring additional focus
on the institution and may also produce sources of revenue,
scholars, and students. Thus, the university can reap many benefits
(tangible and intangible) from its faculty members and their
scholarly efforts.
In addition, the academic expertise of a professor comes
220
a lengthy process of publicizing his or her ideas.
through
about
This process, by its very nature, is one in which theories are tested
and retested in order to determine their viability. The opportunity
to audition or try out theories is valued and expected by scholars.
It is a necessary component of the process because it allows the
professor to refine, advance, or discard a particular theory or an
aspect of it. These opportunities to test theories are encouraged by
the institution itself. Under the rules and regulations of the public
university, college teachers are required to publish scholarly
articles, to participate in academic conferences, and to speak in
responsible citizens, who, in turn, make possible an
enlightened and effective public opinion. Teachers must fulfill
their function by precept and practice, by the very atmosphere

which they generate; they must be exemplars of
open-mindedness and free inquiry. They cannot carry out their
noble task if the conditions for the practice of a responsible
and critical mind are denied to them. They must have the
freedom of responsible inquiry, by thought and action, into the
meaning of social and economic ideas, into the checkered

history of social and economic dogma. They must be free to
sift evanescent doctrine, qualified by time and circumstance,
from that restless, enduring process of extending the bounds of
understanding and wisdom, to assure which the freedoms of

thought, of speech, of inquiry, of worship are guaranteed by
the Constitution of the United States against infraction by
220

national or State government. Id.
Academic expertise is achieved only after many years of formal schooling

beyond the four year undergraduate education. Professors earn doctorates
in their respective fields. Then they spend another five to seven years
teaching, researching, and writing before they achieve tenure.
supra note 33.

See also
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various educational settings in order to achieve tenure at the
university, and to garner respect in the broader academic
community. These theories, then, are the result of academics
professing their views. By testing, refining, and re-testing these
concepts through a variety of formal and informal settings,
professors determine whether their theories will withstand scrutiny
and challenge and, ultimately, add to the knowledge within a
particular subject area.
In contrast, nurses in a public hospital are not hired on the
basis of their ideas; they are employed because they have attained
a certain level of professional training and have passed a
standardized state licensing exam.
These examinations are
designed to determine whether the applicants are conversant with
the standard protocols for medical care. Further, nurses are
employed to perform specific, routine tasks and uniform medical
procedures directly related to patient care.
The hospital's
livelihood is not directly tied to the innovation in ideas or theories
that its nurses produce. The facility's income, in large part, is
driven by the quality and efficiency of the services performed by
its staff, including nurses.
In addition, the hospital seeks
uniformity and conformity in terms of its employees and the
various medical services they deliver daily. Nurses and other
health-care workers must conform to the particular standards of the
hospital. In a medical facility, there is a greater emphasis upon
the uniform and efficient delivery of medical services.
C. The Dissonance between Academic Speech and
Public Employee Speech
To illustrate the dissonance between the public employee
speech doctrine and public university professors, I return briefly to
Connick and Waters.22 1 The principles of these two cases were not
designed for situations that encompass the speech of academics in
an off-campus setting. 222 Jeffries is most telling on this point. In
221 See Connick, 461 U.S. at 138; Waters, 511 U.S. at 661.
122

In both cases, the plaintiffs were speaking in their respective
workplace
settings to other colleagues. See Connick, 461 U.S. at 138 (handing out
questionnaire and talking with fellow employees in the district attorney's
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Connick and Waters, the plaintiff-employees were in the
workplace, speaking with their respective colleagues, and making
comments that were critical of their supervisors. 223 The likelihood
of friction or disharmony in the workplace between the employee
and her direct supervisors was the primary reason that the Court
deferred to the public sector employer in each instance. In
contrast, Jeffries was off campus and speaking at a public event
that was not connected to or funded by his home institution,
CCNY, or by the larger university, CUNY, when he gave the
Albany Speech that became controversial.224 The fact that some
individuals made the connection between Jeffries and CCNY or
that he was introduced as a professor is not relevant because
Jeffries did not hold himself out as a representative of either
CCNY or CUNY. He spoke as an expert on Black history who had
been invited to talk about the work he had done in connection with
a state-funded education commission that had been charged with
studying and proposing changes to the curriculum of the public
schools in New York State. 225 Moreover, the thrust of Jeffries'
Albany Speech was the omission of Black history from the state's
public school curriculum, a topic that was a matter of public
concern to the citizens of the state.
The plaintiffs in Connick226 and Waters227 were speaking
about matters that were deemed by the Court to be personal and
critical of their superiors. They were discussing the decisionmaking and the policies of their superiors while physically present
in their respective workplaces. Of greater significance, neither
Sheila Myers nor Cheryl Churchill were required to speak out
about their views, beliefs, or opinions as a condition of their public
employment. Stated another way, assistant district attorneys are
office); Waters, 511 U.S. at 661 (talking with two colleagues over dinner in
a room adjacent to the nurse's station in the hospital). Indeed, Professor
Jeffries' situation is closer to the facts of Pickering, 391 U.S. at 563

(protecting speech critical of government officials and delivered offcampus).
223 See Connick, 461 U.S. at 141; Waters, 511 U.S. at 665-66.
224 See 52 F.3d at 11.
225 Id. at 12.
226

461 U.S. at 148.

227

511U.S. at681.
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required to carry out the mandate and the directives of the district
attorney for whom they work.22 8 The same is true for nurses
employed in public hospitals. 229 There is no debate about the job
requirements for these lower level employees. Their function is to
perform their assigned duties and not to challenge policies,
procedures, or practices that are put into place by their supervisors
or other high-level decision-makers.
To the contrary, Jeffries was speaking about his academic
area of expertise when he delivered his Albany Speech. He was
hired and tenured by CCNY on the basis of his work in the field of
Black Studies. Further, Jeffries was not on the campus of CCNY
when he spoke about the state's public school curriculum. He did
not criticize the president of CCNY, the faculty members of
CCNY, or the trustees of CUNY.

230

Thus, Jeffries is easily

distinguishable from the plaintiffs in Connick and Waters who
were critical of their supervisors while on the job.
Under CUNY's Bylaws, Jeffries was not required to carry
out a particular mandate of the institution other than to abide by
those rules. As a Department Chair, Jeffries was obligated to
handle rather routine ministerial duties such assigning courses,
preparing the department's budget, and supervising the
department.2 3 1 In his role as a classroom teacher, Jeffries was
required to carry out his teaching assignments. According to
CCNY's three cursory investigations of his work as a Chair and
teacher, Jeffries had met his obligations.232
Additionally, Jeffries was not found to be uttering
statements that were simply the airing of personal grievances
against his supervisors in the workplace, as was true of the plaintiff
in Connick. Rather, his comments on the absence of Black history
from the state's public school curriculum were interspersed with
bigoted statements about whites, Jews, and a high-ranking member
228

461 U.S. at 147-49.

229

511 U.S. at 667-69.

23o

Both plaintiffs in Connick and Waters had been critical of their employers
and supervisors. See Connick, 461 U.S. at 140-42; Waters, 511 U.S. at 667.
See Bylaws of Board of Trustees By Laws, The City University
of New

231

York, § 9.3 Duties of Department Chairperson (Sept.1993) (on file with
232

author).

See 828 F. Supp. at 1082.
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of the U.S. Department of Education. These statements were
presented at a public gathering in Albany, New York, more than
125 miles from the CCNY campus. The audience received
Jeffries' comments with applause. On the day that Jeffries
delivered his Albany Speech, there was little or no attention paid to
it by the general public, the media, university administrators, or
elected officials. More than two weeks passed before a number of
local and state politicians began to complain publicly in the news
media about Jeffries' comments and demand that the university do
something to silence or censure the professor. Once the full force
of the media, the governor and other elected officials was brought
to bear on President Harleston of CCNY, he instituted an
investigation of the matter.
When deffries reached its conclusion, the result was a blow
for academics and the intellectual freedom that is at the center of
university as marketplace for intellectual experimentation. The
application of Waters' principles to a controversial professor
provided the university with an easy solution to a tough problem.
D. Righting the Balance of Interests in Public Higher
Education
Because the public employee speech doctrine has been
weighted in favor of the public employer as a result of the
decisions in Connick and Waters, there can be greater restrictions
placed on the expression of professors in public higher education
as Jeffries illustrates. 233 However, both the professor's and the
university's interests are important and should be respected in any
process of dispute resolution. In order to achieve a more equitable
balance of these two competing interests, the scales must be reset
where academic speech is at issue.
I propose a test of factors to reposition the balancing of the
academic's interest in commenting on matters directly tied to her
scholarly expertise and the university's interest in educating its
students without disruption. First, the professor should be required
to demonstrate that the expressive activity at issue is related
233

See supranotes 221-32 and accompanying
text.
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directly to her academic expertise. 234 If it is, the activity will be
presumed to be protected academic speech. The burden then
moves to the public university to rebut this presumption. In
shifting the burden to the institution, the problem of the weak,
incompetent, or non-existent investigation would likely be reduced
or even eliminated. The proceedings would promote the objectives
of fairness, thoroughness, and competence on the part of the
university's administrators.
The institution would have to
undertake a reasonable and reliable inquiry before any action could
be taken against the professor. To provide guidance for a
reasonable investigation, I propose a modification of the Pickering
standard that requires the public university to assess the following
factors: 1) whether the professor has daily contact with the person
or persons about whom the comments were made; 2) whether there
is an adverse impact on other professors or an impairment of
discipline by supervisors such as deans, provost, or the president;
3) whether the professor's expressive activity impeded her
performance of her duties as a teacher or researcher or scholar; 4)
whether the professor's expressive activity interfered with the
regular, daily operations of the university, including its fund
raising from alumni, such that there is an actual disruption; and 5)
whether the expressive activity occurred on-campus 236 or off-

234

The expressive activity must have a direct connection
to the professor's

academic expertise. This would eliminate from coverage, the potential
claim that an engineering professor who spoke about theories of eugenics in
his classroom was engaged in protected academic speech. See, e.g., OLIVAS,
supra note 33, at 153 (describing the refusal of Stanford University to allow

Professor William Shockley, Nobel Prize winner in electrical engineering,
to teach a course on his theory of eugenics). The proposed standard
incorporates the requirement that the academic speech in question is the
motivating factor in the public university's action against the professor.
235 These rules could be memorialized in
the university's by-laws, its collective
bargaining agreements, or in its employment handbook.
Although the central focus of this essay is off-campus expressive activity of
a public university professor, there is also the issue of an academic's inclass speech and conduct. This latter subject is beyond the scope of this
article. See supranote 12 (collecting commentary about in-class speech).
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campus. 237 The university would be required to make written
findings as to each factor.
This standard would place duties and obligations on the
professor and the university. It would allow the academic and
high-level administrators an opportunity to parse through the facts,
the rights, the duties, and the responsibilities of each party in order
to arrive at a more balanced and equitable result. Further, the
standard creates specific guidelines so that both the professor and
the university would have a better understanding of the process and
their respective roles in it. Perhaps such a set of guidelines would
reduce or minimize the number of incidents that reach the federal
courts as full-blown disputes because both sides would have an
opportunity to present, debate, and review the relevant facts.
Indeed, it might further the goal of resolving the dispute at an
earlier stage because each side would have a set of guidelines in
place that spell out the standards and responsibilities on both sides
of the line. Finally, each side might have more confidence in a
standard that creates obligations for both parties.
VII. Conclusion
Academic speech, a zone of protected expressive activity
directly tied to the professor's expertise both inside and outside the
public university, is essential to the vitality of the public university
or college. If higher education is truly to be a marketplace of
ideas, the multitude of voices, as the Supreme Court has often said
it is, 238 then the public institution must accept the verbal tumult,
discord, and even unpleasantness, that may accompany the
expression of minority, unorthodox, or dissident viewpoints either
inside or outside of the academic setting. The university as an
intellectual marketplace of ideas and information exchange can be
237

If the expressive activity takes place off campus, the university should make
an inquiry as to whether the professor held herself out as a university
spokesperson or as an expert in her field. The former might present the

university with a reason to be concerned that the professor is impermissibly
holding out herself in a role that she is not authorized to play. In the latter
situation, the professor's academic expertise would be examined on its
238

merits.

See supranotes 5, 81-84.
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analogized to a formal debate where there is verbal interaction noisy challenges, verbal sparring, and vociferous disagreements as points are made and disputed by each side. Perhaps the public
university is not precisely a verbal free-for-all but it should be an
open forum for the sharing of multiple and diverse ideas, where
concepts are challenged, debated, contested, and either accepted or
rejected. It should be a space, a metaphorical laboratory for
intellectual experimentation, where increased understanding can be
achieved through an exchange of a variety of different, diverse,
and differing ideas. This experimental model requires ample
room, enough breathing space, so that various ideas from a broad
theoretical spectrum can have an opportunity to be reviewed,
critiqued, debated, refined, reformulated, and, on occasion,
discarded.
A metaphorical laboratory of idea exchange is also larger
than the public university because a professor's theories are not
confined to or contained within the four walls of the institution of
higher education. Ideas are easily portable and transmittable.
Academics carry their theories and inquiries with them wherever
they may travel, thinking and talking about these concepts in a
variety of settings. Theories are the stock in trade of professors,
the basis upon which they earn their livelihood. Teachers are often
asked to speak about their theoretical perspectives and research in
settings outside the university. Not only are these opportunities for
professors to explain their viewpoints but they also afford
academics with the chance to receive comments, questions, and
challenges to their theories. Professors learn from others and, quite
frequently, factor in those additional queries, critiques, and
remarks as they refine their thinking in their particular area of
expertise.
Without wide-ranging, free-flowing academic speech,
professors will tend to stifle and suppress new ideas, limit or
eliminate challenges to existing theories, and confine or constrict
knowledge as though it can be frozen in time. Academics will
become overly cautious - even timid - in their theorizing and their
commenting upon their ideas. In turn, higher education and,
ultimately, society will suffer because the advancement of
knowledge and the resolution of societal problems will be hindered
and, then, halted.
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If the concepts of democracy, free speech, academic
freedom, and higher education are to have meaning with regard to
the academic speech of public university professors, then these
terms must have a bite rather than just a bark. 239 At the same time,
they must be balanced without weighting one at the expense of the
others. If, as a society, we seek a citizenry of critical thinkers who
can participate actively and effectively in the democratic process,
then we must allow - even encourage - the rough and tumble of
the intellectual marketplace that flows from the minds and theories
of academics, and is enhanced by a variety of diverse perspectives.
The pluralistic public university is (and must continue to be) a
mirror of our larger society. 240 In the institutional setting where
multiple ideas are in play, there will inevitably be conflicts. These
clashes of ideas, ideologies, and values are part and parcel of the
intellectual marketplace of learning, teaching, and experimenting.
Thus, academic speech must be encouraged by protecting rather
than curtailing it.

239 By affording protection to academic speech, the scales are more evenly

balanced between the professor and the university. Once a professor
demonstrates that her speech is directly related to her academic expertise,

the university will have to rebut this presumption through credible evidence.
Each side is obligated to produce relevant proof. In turn, this process can
assist both sides in resolving the conflict by reviewing the documents and
witnesses that have been produced. It becomes a more transparent process.
240 See Jennifer Elrod, Expressive Activity, True Threats, and the
First
Amendment, 36 CONN. L. REV. 541, 550-53 (2004) (describing the centrality

of robust debate in a democracy).

